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JOINDER OF CLALNIS AND PARTIES UNDER
MODERN PLEADING RULES
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT*

"The King of Brogdignag gave it for his opinion that,
'whoever could make two ears of corn, or two blades of
grass to grow upon a spot of ground where only one grew
before, would deserve better of mankind, and do more essential service to his country than the whole race of politicians
put together.' In matters of justice, however, the benefactor
is he who makes one lawsuit grow where two grew before."
-Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 148 (1950).
if the test of Chafee's set out above is apt, the
title of "benefactor" should surely be applied to the Advisory
Committee which drafted the new Rules of Civil Procedure, and
to the Supreme Court which adopted them. These rules had two
significant objectives which represent departures from prior Minnesota practice; one was to deemphasize the pleadings and look instead to the actual facts and issues as developed by discovery and
the pre-trial conference; the second, no less important, was to
settle as many matters as possible in one lawsuit.
I shall discuss below in detail the specifics of all of the devices
for joinder which are provided by Rules 13 to 24. But I think
it well to emphasize clearly from the outset what the philosophy
of these rules is, for it is only by reference to their purpose and
philosophy that the language of the rules can, in many cases, be
meaningfully interpreted. The purpose, as has been indicated, is to
make "one lawsuit grow where two grew before." The philosophy
is that joinder is not properly a pleading problem, but rather is
one of trial convenience, which can be judged best only at the
time of trial. Under our old practice, for example, if two persons
wdre injured in an automobile accident by the negligence of some
other driver, they were obliged to sue separately to get redress for
their wounds.1 This result was reached because each of the injured
persons was said to have a separate cause of action, and the statute'
required that causes of action joined "must affect all the parties
to the action." If a general rule must be laid down in advance, this
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. 2 Pirsig's Dunnell on Minnesota Pleading §§ 1864, 1754 (3d ed.
N MINNESOTA,

1944) (cited hereafter as Pirsig's Dunnell). There was discretionary authority to consolidate the trials of the separate actions. See Chellico v. Martire, 227 Minn. 74, 34 N. W. 2d 155 (1948).
2. Minn. Stat. §544.27 (1949).
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is probably as sound as any which could be devised, for considered
in the abstract there is a natural reluctance to make a person a party
to a suit if much of the litigation is going to be on issues in which
he has no interest. But when one comes down from the abstract
to consider specific cases, this conclusion is not nearly so inevitable
as it previously seemed. In the usual collision case the principal
issue, that of negligence, will be precisely the same for each of the
injured persons who wish to join as plaintiffs, and every instinct
toward a speedy and economical disposition of the claims arising
from the accident will dictate that the injured persons be allowed
to join in one action.
Suppose, then, that the statute were amended to allow joinder
of parties plaintiff suing on separate causes of action. The case may
then arise in which the defendant has a defense of contributory
negligence against the plaintiff-driver but fears that the jury will
be prejudiced against him by its sympathy for the plaintiff-passenger
who suffered hideous injuries and against whom that defense is
not available. Should he be required to stand trial against both
of these plaintiffs at one time?
The genius of the new rules is their recognition that no rule
of pleading, which necessarily must turn on identity of causes of
action and similar a priori concepts, can offer a satisfying answer
to all the different kinds of fact situations which may arise. The
only valid way to handle the problem is to say that it is desirable to
include as many claims and parties as there are in one suit, except
where this may make the suit too many-sided and complicated for
the jury to unravel, or where this free joinder may cause prejudice
to some party or claim. And no legislature can say what the optimum size of a lawsuit is under each particular constellation of
allegations in the pleadings. The new rules, therefore, allow, for
practical purposes, joinder of any claim or any party, and then
leave it to the trial judge to order separate trials for particular
claims or issues "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice."'
With this background of free joinder at the pleading stage and
wide discretion in the judge at the trial stage, it is now possible
to examine the specific provisions which the new rules make,
first for joinder of claims, counterclaims, and crossclaims, then
joinder of parties and the special devices of party joinder, impleader,
interpleader, class actions, and intervention.
3. finnesota Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts, Rule
42.02 (1952) (cited hereafter as Minn. R.C.P.).
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JOINDE3 OF CLAIMS

The modern solution to the problem of joinder of claims is simplicity itself; under Rule 18.01 a party "may join either as independent or as alternative claims as many claims either legal or
equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party provided
they do not require separate places of trial." This supersedes the old
statute, which set up six specific classes of cases, and allowed joinder
only if all the causes joined fell into one of these six classes, or if
they arose out of "the same transaction or transactions connected
with the same subject of action ."4
Criticism of the old statute as "one of the least satisfactory provisions of the Field Code"5 was extremely well taken, and this even
though the construction Minnesota put upon it was notably more
liberal than that of many states. The six specified classes were
entirely arbitrary, and little used. And while the "same transaction"
clause gave some relief from the rigidity of the classes, it suffered
from its own vice of being so vague as to defy definition., Practically
all the Supreme Court could ever say was that a particular case
did or did not fall within the broad statutory language, and litigants
were left at their peril. Thus where plaintiff claimed that defendant
had violated an agreement as to division of the use of a mill the parties owned in common, and claimed also that defendant had diverted water from the stream which ran the mill, the court held
that two causes of action had been improperly joined. 7 Since one
claim was on a contract, while the second sounded in tort, they did
not fall into any one of the classes, nor did they arise from the
"same transaction," although the court failed to explain the grounds
for its intuition to this effect. Surely it is senseless to require two
law suits to decide the disputes between the parties about the common mill, and under Rule 18.01 such joinder would present no
difficulty. In another old case, typical of the restrictiveness of the
former statute, the court struck down for misjoinder a complaint
which claimed damages for the withholding of one parcel of land
and which also sought to recover possession of another parcel, with
-damages for the withholding thereof." Again the decision is neces4. Minn. Stat. §544.27 (1949).
5. 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §1762.
6. Courts in other states have made famous attempts at definition, but
the result was a definition as vague and as useless for practical purposes as
the original terms. See Stone v. Case, 34 Okl. 5, 13-22, 124 Pac. 960, 963967 (1912) ; McArthur v. Moffet, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N.W. 445 (1910).
7. Gertler v. Linscott, 26 Minn. 82 (1879).
S. Holmes v. Williams, 16 Minn. 164 (1870).
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sarily devoid of any explanation why such joinder is improper.
Again the joinder would be automatic under the new rules.
The weakness of the old Code statute is best illustrated by a
famous New York case which seems almost a reductio ad absurdlun.
Defendant walked up to plaintiff, called him a slanderous name,
and hit him. The court held that plaintiff must bring two suits, one
for slander and one for assault. The claims do not fall into the same
class, and they could not be joined as arising out of the "same transaction" since "assault and slander may arise at or about the same
time, but in the very nature of things are separate and distinct."'
Under the new rules sound and efficient judicial administration need
not be hampered by metaphysical inquiries as to "the very nature
r1f things."
The old law required that causes of action joined had to be
separately stated; the new rules require this only where "a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. ' 10 Of
considerably more practical importance is the specific provision of
the rules that a party may join inconsistent claims.11 The vice of the
requirement of consistency of causes joined under the Code 12 was
that, even if it were liberally applied, it could mean that a party
uncertain as to his legal rights would have to bring two or more
actions to vindicate them, while if the requirement were strictly
applied, it became an application of the doctrine of "election of
remedies" in all its harshness. 13 This is beautifully illustrated by a
horrible M[innesota case, in which plaintiff was uncertain whether
defendant was his tenant, or whether they had a tenancy in common. He joined counts based on both theories, and the trial court,
9. Raspaulo v. Ragona, 127 Misc. 160, 215 N. Y. Supp. 407 (Sup. Ct.
1926). To much the same effect is Pressley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 226 N. C. 518, 39 S. E. 2d 382 (1946). In Harris v. Avery, 5 Kan. 146
(1869), claims for false imprisonment and for slander were said to arise
from the "same transaction."
10. Minn. R.C.P. 10.02. For a perceptive analysis of when such a
separate statement may be necessary, see 2 Moore's Federal Practice §10.03
2d. ed. 1948).
11. Minn. R.C.P. 8.05(2). This provision is made explicit because of
some tendency to urge that the requirement of consistency be read by the
courts back into codes which were merely silent on the question. See Carr,
Some Aspects of Joinder of Causes, 5 Ford. L. Rev. 452, 456 (1936) ; 37
Col. L. Rev. 462, 471 (1937) ; 38 Col. L. Rev. 292, 316, 321 (1938); 9
Brooklyn L. Rev. 223 (1939).
12. Minn. Stat. §544.27 (1949); Vaule v. Steenerson, 63 Minn. 110,
65 N.W. 257 (1895).
13. See Clark, Cases on Modern Pleading 684-686 (1952). Having
assisted Judge Clark in the editing of this collection of materials, I have
felt free in many places, as here, to avail myself of its analysis and even,
occasionally, its specific language.
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finding them inconsistent, required him to elect on which theory he
would go to trial. He chose the theory based on tenancy in common, and lost, but he found no sympathy in the Supreme Court.
That body pontificated: "If the facts turned out to be of such a character that the plaintiff could have recovered as Lodowic's landlord, . . it was a misfortune to have elected to proceed upon another basis, but a misfortune of which the plaintiff can hardly coinplain, since the election was his own.'1 4 Compare with this horror
the decision, quite typical of those under modem rules, that plaintiff may join in his complaint allegations that defendant was liable
(a) as a shareholder in a trust, (b) as a partner, and (c) as trustee,
leaving it to the court to decide on which theory defendant should
be held.' 5
One further matter needs to be discussed, because of a misconception set forth by the Advisory Committee in their notes to
the new rules. After correctly remarking that while joinder of
claims is made freely available under Rule 18.01, it is not made
compulsory, they go on to say:
"In view of the fact that there is authority for the proposition
that a judgment is res judicata not only as to what was actually
litigated, but also as to matters which might have been litigated,
including separate causes of action which might have been
joined, an attorney should certainly not hesitate to take advantage of the apparent permissive feature of Rule 18.01. King v.
C., M. & St. P. R. R., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113."1
Much can be said for the notion that joinder of related claims
should be made compulsory.'Y And, as I shall show in a mo14. Hause v. Hause, 29 Mirn. 252, 253, 13 N. W. 43 (1882). Compare
2 Pirsig's Dunnell §1763 n. 97: "This is more reminiscent of the reasoning
of mediaeval courts than an example to be followed in the present day administration of justice."
15. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Goldberg, 143 F. 2d 752 (7th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 770 (1944). See also 2 Moore's Federal Practice
§8.32 (2d ed. 1948).
16. Advisory Comm. Note 6 to Rule 18.01. (The Advisory Committee
notes are most conveniently available in the 1950 publication by the West
Publishing Co. of the Tentative Draft of the Rules.) The same statement
is made by the Revisor of Statules at Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
for the District Courts 159-160 (1952).
17. Clark, Cases on Modern Pleading 730 (1952): "In the view of
distinguished commentators the federal system itself does not state the ultimate word as to joinder, but that for efficient dispatch of, litigation there
must and should be required joinder beyond any now stated. Thus see Blume,
Required Joinder of Claims, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 797, 812, 1947: 'Judges
have been appalled by the thougkt of trying in one action all claims which
might arise from a major disaster. The writer is appalled by the thought of
any other course.' See also Blume, The Scope of A Civil Action, 42 Mich.
L. Rev. 257, 1943; Schopflocher, What Is A Single Cause of Action for the
Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 Ore. L. Rev. 319, 1942; 37
Col. L. Rev. 462, 1937."
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ment, caution may dictate that the lawyer join what seem to him
to be separate claims, for fear of a later decision that he has split
what was really only one claim. But however laudable the goals
sought to be served by the Advisory Committee in the quoted note,
their statement that a judgment is res judicata as to separate causes
of action which might have been joined, and that therefore Rule
18.01 is only "apparently permissive," sets out a notion which has
never been the law, here or elsewhere, which is not the law under
any rules, new or old, and which is flatly contradicted by the case
cited. The important and influential King case holds that where
plaintiff has suffered injuries to both his person and his property
he has only one cause of action, which he cannot split and litigate
in two separate suits. The court decided that plaintiff's prior action
for his personal injuries barred a later suit for property damage, not
because the latter was a separate cause of action which might have
been joined, but because both injuries were part of but one cause
of action.
Now the rule against splitting a single cause of action, set out
in the King case, did mean that the lawyer who refrained from
joining what he thought were different causes, and what a court
might possibly hold to be parts of a single cause, did so at his peril.
And the difficulties in deciding what a cause of action is"8 made this
peril no trivial one. This peril is, if anything, increased under the
new rules where the concept of "cause of action" is junked, and the
"claim for relief"' 9 substituted. And thus it would seem to be good
advice to the practicing lawyer to urge him to join all the demands
which his client may have against defendant, lest they be determined
to have been part of a single claim for relief. But if they are, indeed,
separate claims for relief, the fact that they can be joined does not
mean that they must be joined.
Rule 18.02 may be touched on briefly; it authorizes the joinder
of claims although heretofore one of them could have been made only
after the other had been prosecuted to a conclusion. The chief usefulness of this is to codify the better previous practice of allowing joinder of a claim on a debt with a claim against the debtor's transferee to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance.20 Rule 18.02 might be construed
18. The scholarly and judicial difficulties are carefully examined at
Clark on Code Pleading 127-148 (2d ed. 1947).
19. Defined id. at 137-139.

20. The better prior practice was exemplified by Benton v. Collins,
118 N. C. 196, 24 S. E. 122 (1896), and had been adopted in Minnesota as

a part of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, Minn. Stat. §§513.28,
513.29 (1949), discussed at length in Lind v. 0. N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn.
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as allowing joinder of a claim against a tortfeasor with a claim
against his liability insurer, but the decisions so far have refused to
make this construction.

21

It seems something of a pity to leave the subject of joinder of
claims, about which so much hoary learning has accumulated, after
a discussion in such short compass. But in truth there is nothing
more which could be said. Of all the provisions of the Federal
Rules and their state counterparts dealing with joinder, this rule
on joinder of claims has operated most smoothly and satisfactorily.
Indeed even this brief discussion might have been omitted, for it
was all summed up in a nutshell by the distinguished court which
said: "Where the claims are against the same defendants, certainly,
there can be no misjoinder of claims in a civil action." 22
JOINDER OF COUNTERCLAIMS

The provisions dealing with joinder of counterclaims, too,
should have been quite easy to understand and apply in Minnesota,
as they have been in the Federal system and in the other states
which have adopted modern pleading. Regrettably the Minnesota
Rules here have made a departure from the Federal model which
has introduced considerable confusion into the subject, and which
can only be resolved by a Supreme Court decision or an amendment
of the rules.
Under the Code counterclaims could be pleaded in only two
situations: where the original claim was on a contract, defendant
could plead as a counterclaim a claim in his favor on another contract-this corresponded roughly to the common law right of "setoff"; and defendant in any action'could plead as a counterclaim a
cause of action "arising out of the contract or transaction pleaded
in the complaint as the foundation of plaintiff's claim, or connected
30, 282 N.W. 661 (1938). Practice under the new rule is discussed in Wynne
v. Boone, 191 F. 2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
21. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §18.08, p. 1828 (2d ed. 1948). These
decisions are, however, all from the Federal courts, where the brooding omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins poses its special problems. It is quite possible
that a state court would feel freer to hold that Rule 18.02 accelerates determination of the liability of the irsurer, Proceedings of Cleveland Institute
on Federal Rules 329 (A.B.A., 1938), just as the "may be liable" provision
of Rule 14.01 allows defendant to implead his insurer. See pp. 614-621 below.
Joinder of the insurer has worked without difficulty in those jurisdictions
which have been bold enough to give it a try. See Note, Permissive Joinder
as a Substitute for Excluding Evidence That Defendant is Insured, 59 Yale
L. J. 1160 (1950).
22. Fee, D. J., in Atlantic Lumber Corp. v. Southern Pacific Corp.. 2
F. R. D. 313-314 (D. Ore. 1941).
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with the subject of the action" 2 3 -the analogy here was to the common-law right of "recoupment." All this is gone under Rule 13
which allows the defendant to plead as a counterclaim any claim
whatsoever which he may have against the plaintiff.
But the new rule goes even further than this. Not only now you
plead as a counterclaim any claim which you have, it says, but certain claims which defendants will have against plaintiffs must be
pleaded as counterclaims, on pain of being barred from later asserting them in another suit. This then is the notorious "compulsory
counterclaim," which has caused, as we shall see in tedious detail,
more confusion than any other provision of the Minnesota reform
-it is merely a system to insure that when defendant's claim
against plaintiff is closely related to plaintiff's claim against him,
both claims will be decided and disposed of in one law suit.
There is nothing new about making certain counterclaims compulsory: California as long ago as 1872 required the assertion of
counterclaims which arose out of the transaction pleaded in the
25
complaint, 24 and a number of other states followed its example.

Other states took a middle course by providing that if the defendant did not plead a counterclaim when he could have, he was barred
from recovering costs in a later action on the claim.2 6 In the
Federal system compulsory counterclaims were provided for in
1912 in equitable actions, 27 and were an important feature of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The impetus of the Federal
reform on state procedures carried the compulsory counterclaim
with it to another large group of states, 28 and it proved so successful that it was even adopted by a few states which did not adopt
the Federal Fules generally. 29
This, then, is the background: the compulsory counterclaim has
been tested in practice in 13 states, two territories, and all the
Federal courts. If one can form a judgment from the decided cases,
from the law review commentaries, and from the reactions of lawyers
in these legal systems-and I am at a loss to know what other
23. Minn. Stat. §544.05 (1949).

24. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §438 (Deering, 1949).
25. Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah. See Clark on Code Pleading
j46 n. 54 (2d ed. 1947).
26. Indiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. See Clark,
loc. cit. note 25 supra.
27. Federal Equity Rule 30 (1912).
28. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, New M1exico, Puerto Rico,
and Utah. Of the states which have adopted the Federal Rules only New
Jersey has made no provision for compulsory counterclaims.
29. Florida, Iowa, Missouri, and Texas.
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basis there can be for judgment-it has worked with complete
smoothness and satisfaction in those systems no matter what kind
of case was involved.
Of course even-without a rule or a statute there is considerable
pressure on the defendant to plead his claim as a counterclaim in
those kinds of cases where the claims are closely related and where
the compulsory counterclaim rule operates: if the issue is the same
on both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's claim, res judicata
-or perhaps more accurately, "estoppel by verdict"-would bar
a later action by the defendant.30 Further, while res judicata is so
difficult, confusing, and serious as to be a trap for the unwary,
it can only operate to the disadvantage of the defendant who prefers to play dog in the manger and save his claim for a later suit.
In a collision case, for example, a judgment for the plaintiff establishes his lack of negligence and will bar a subsequent action for
negligence by the defendant, but a judgment for the defendant does
not establish plaintiff's negligence and defendant will still have to
go to the trouble and expense of proving the same facts all over
again in his later action.31
It was, undoubtedly, with these persuasive arguments for the
compulsory counterclaim in mind that the Minnesota Advisory
Committee in its original draft of the new rules followed precisely
the Federal model. Rules 13.01 and 13.02 in the Tentative Draft
of 1950 were identical with Federal Rules 13(a) and 13(b) and
provided, with limitations not here relevant, that if defendant's
claim "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim" it had to be pleaded
as a compulsory counterclaim, while any claim "not arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim" was a permissive counterclaim. So far,
so good.
By September, 1950, however, the Committee had taken a step
backward. For they then changed their rules so that compulsory
counterclaims were those arising out of the "contract or transaction"
involved in plaintiff's claim, rather than the "transaction or occur30. E.g., Holman v. Tjaseng, 136 Wash. 261, 203 Pac. 545 (1925), 39
Harv. L. Rev. 658 (1926). See Clark on Code Pleading 646-647 (2d ed.
1947); 29 Yale L. J.695 (1920). This is discussed at length, if inconclusively, in Gustafson v. Gustafson, 178 Minn. 1, 226 N. W. 412 (1929).
31. Restatement, Judgments l58 ills. 5, 9 (1942) ; Developmcnts in the
Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 845-846 (1952). Cf. Allamong
v. Falkenhof, 39 Ohio App. 515, 177 N. E. 789 (1930); Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F. 2d 983, 988-993 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Clark on Code Pleading 647 n.
56 (2d ed. 1947) ; Note, 8 A. L. R. 694, 727-731 (1920) ; Note, 3 Syracuse L.
Rev. 307 (1952).
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rence" as before, and permissive counterclaims were those "not
arising out of the contract, transaction, or occurrence"' involved
in plaintiff's claim. These nice distinctions among such generalities
as "contract," "transaction," and "occurrence" were explained by
the Committee on the basis of fears:
46.. that compulsory counterclaims in personal injury and
other tort actions may work a hardship in cases where, for instance, the defendant's injury is presently unknown or where he
is not represented by an attorney who appears primarily for
him ...."3Now this change can be criticized from a number of angles:
perhaps most obvious is that, as a matter of draftsmanship, it led
to a patent absurdity. Reading the language used in the light of
the Committee's explanation, they must have regarded "contract
or transaction" as excluding torts, while "contract, transaction, or
occurrence" included torts. But then, because 13.01 is phrased affirmatively, while 13.02 is phrased negatively, it amounted to this: if
the claim arose from a contract (or transaction) it was compulsory,
while permissive counterclaims were those not arising from either
contracts or torts. Thus there was no authority given to use a tort
claim even as a permissive counterclaim, a result which the Committee surely did not intend.
A much more important criticism runs to the merits of the
change. Is it undesirable to make counterclaims compulsory in
personal injury and other tort cases? Certainly as a matter of judicial administration it is extremely desirable to settle all the claims
arising from one accident in a single suit, for there are more personal injury actions than any other kind in our courts. If the
reform is not to be applied in this area, it becomes comparatively
unimportant. Certainly, too, all experience elsewhere teaches that
the compulsory counterclaim presents no difficulties in personal
injury actions. 33 And the specific problems adverted to by the
Committee seem to be imaginary horribles. It is unrealistic to suppose that tort actions will be disposed of so quickly by our courts
that the case will be over before defendant knows he has been hurt;
Rule 13.05 explicitly authorizes defendant to set up his counterclaim by supplemental pleading if it matures only after he has filed
32. 7 Bench and Bar of Minnesota, Sept. 1950, p. 18.
33. E.g., Sinkbeil v. Handler, 7 F. R. D. 92 (D. Neb. 1946) ; Coates v.
Ellis, 61 A. 2d 28 (Mun. Ct. App., D.C., 1948); Blackmar, Some Problems
Regarding Compulsory Counterclahns Uider the Federal Riles and the
Missouri Code, 19 U. of Kan. City L. Rev. 38, 46-47 (1951). See Developinents inthe Law--Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 832 (1952) ; Clark,
The Sinumary Judgment, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 567, 571 n. 18 (1952).
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his original answer. Rule 13.06 expands on this by allowing defendant, with leave of court, to amend his answer to set up a counterclaim omitted through "oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect." 4 And the argument: that the attorney representing defendant is really interested in protecting the insurance company
which pays his salary hardly carries any weight. The lawyer in this
position who fails to advise defendant of the necessity of setting up
his own claim would surely be in trouble with the Canons of Legal
Ethics ;s this differs only in degree, however, from his responsibility to advise defendant, under the existing law, of the perils
of res judicata.
Procedural reform, like politics, is the art of the possible, and
in this concession on compulsory counterclaims was necessary to
win support for the rest of the rules from members of the bar
who customarily act for insured defendants, then the Committee
was doubtless well advised to make the concession. " On principle,
however, it seems impossible to justify.
We cannot end this melancholy history so soon. Apparently
the Committee realized the difficulties which its choice of language
would cause, for less than four weeks before the rules were to be
effective the Court ex parte amended 13.01 and 13.02 again.ar The
confusing word "contract" which the Committee had resurrected
34. In the delightful case of Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Allentown &
Reading Transit Co., 185 F. 2d 918 (4th Cir. 1950), defendant carrier was
allowed to amend its answer to plead a counterclaim which had been omitted
only because its counsel had never read the Federal Rules in the 12 years
they had then been in effect 1
35. Cf. Opinion 231, A. B. A. Comm. on Prof. Ethics and Grievances
(1941). Quaere: wouldn't the lawyer also be liable to defendant for malpractice ?
36. This becomes a dangerous principle if carried too far. In procedural
reform half a loaf may confuse the Bar, and may be inherently unsatisfactory, and yet it will exhaust the forces which are working for thoroughgoing change; in this way it is probably much worse than none. See Clark,
Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reforn, 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 121 (1940);
Clark, The Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 Tex. L.
Rev. 4 (1941). But of course all this is relative, and I do not feel that the
concessions which the Minnesota reformers were forced to make have impaired the essential integrity of the new rules. Indeed, much credit is due
to Chairman Youngquist and his able colleagues on the Advisory Committee for having made so few concessions and having gotten the rules adopted
over opposition that I had feared might make up in vociferousness what it
lacked in reasoned arguments.
37. 233 Minn. vii (Dec. 6, :1951). Apparently even the Revisor of
Statutes has been baffled by this latest change, for in his recent official publication, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 122-125
(1952), he states correctly the text of Rule 13.01 as it now stands, but uses
indiscriminately Notes addressed to each of the forms which the language
of the rule has taken, and he annotates the rule with a selection of Federal
cases, without indicating that they turn on different language.
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from the former Code statute was buried once more, and everything
was made to turn on the concept "transaction." If the claim arises
out of the "transaction that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim" it is a compulsory counterclaim; if it does not arise
from the "transaction" it is a permissive counterclaim. Our inquiry now must be, what is the meaning of "transaction." The literature and the case law on this word are voluminous.35 The United
3
States Supreme Court has called it "a word of flexible meaning." 0
Certainly cases can be found which say that "transaction" refers
only to business negotiations, and therefore does not include torts
within its orbit.4 0 The trouble is that even more authorities can

be found which are precisely contrary, 41 and, most important for
our purpose, Minnesota falls in this latter class. Our court declared
itself unequivocally in a leading case in which it was called on to
construe the word where it appeared in our old statute for joinder
42
of causes :

"That causes of action in tort are included within the meaning of this statute is quite obvious. The word 'transaction,' as
there used, embraces something more than contractual relations. It includes any occurrences or affairs the result of which
vests in a party the right to maintain an action, whether the
occurrences be in the nature of tort or otherwise."'
This does not mean that the Court will necessarily construe
13.01 as it now stands as including tort claims. Indeed this whole
history has been so tenuous that litigation over the matter seems
sure. But until the Court has ruled otherwise, the lawyer who
ignores this clear expression by our own Court as to the meaning
of the key term, and who thus holds back a claim which defendant
has arising from an accident, is playing dangerously fast and loose
with his client's interests.
The other questions which the new counterclaim provisions present are, by comparison, quite simple. A counterclaim is permissive
only, rather than compulsory, if it did not exist at the time of serv38. It is cited and discussed at Clark on Code Pleading 653-660 (2d ed.
1947). And see 36 Yale L. J. 148 (1926) ; 21 Col. L. Rev. 196 (1921).
39. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 610 (1926).
40. Hooven v. Meyer, 74 Ind. App. 9, 128 N. E. 614 (1920), criticised
6 Cornell L. Q. 318 (1921; Commercial Credit Co. v. Peak, 195 Cal. 27, 231
Pac. 340 (1926) ; see Sinkbeil v. Handler, 7 F. R. D. 92, 97 (D. Neb. 1946).

41.

"The term 'transaction' is not legal and technical; it is common and

colloquial; it is therefore to be construed according to the context and to
approved usage; ... as so construed it is broader than 'contract' and broader
than 'tort', although it may include either or both ...
" Pomeroy, Code

Remedies §650 *774 (5th ed. 1929).
42.
43.

Minn. Stat. §544.27 (1949).
Mayberry v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 79, 84, 110 N. W.

356, 358 (1907).
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ing of defendant's answer, if it requires for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over which the court cannot get jurisdiction, or if, at the commencement of the sudt, it was the subject of
another pending action. 44 Just as under the old law, additional parties can be brought in if they are necessary to grant complete relief
on a counterclaim, and thus defendant can counterclaim against
plaintiff and a third party. 41 The requirement under the Code that
the counterclaim be against all the plaintiffs and in favor of all
the defendants 0 is dropped. Where the counterclaim comes from
the same transaction as does plaintiff's claim-and thus is a compulsory counterclaim-defendant may assert it to defeat plaintiff's
claim even though otherwise it would be barred by the statute of
limitations.4 - A counterclaim is allowed in the reply;48 while an
argument can be made that this is limited to compulsory counterclaims, 9 the question seems academic, for the better practice in any
event is for plaintiff to amend his complaint-to join the new claim.
Can a counterclaim be used by or against a party in a different
capacity from that in which he was sued? Under the old law, for
example, in an action brought by a partnership, defendant could
not counterclaim against one of the partners individually. Such
a counterclaim will, however, be allowed under the new rules.5' And
where an insurance company brings a tort action as subrogee to
recover for damage caused its insured, and for which the insured
has collected from the company, a counterclaim may be asserted
against the insurer for loss allegedly caused defendant by the insured.5 2 Where a true representative capacity is involved, there is
support for a different result: it has been held that in a suit by trus44. Minn. R. C. P. 13.01. These limitations are discussed at 3 Moore's
Federal Practice §13.14 (2d ed. 1948).
45. Minn. R. C. P. 13.08; 3 Moore's Federal Practice §13.39 (2d ed.
1948). The old law was Minn. Stat. §540.16 ( 1 94 9)-see 2 Pirsig's Dunnell
§1776.

46. Minn. Stat. §544.05 (1949). See 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §1775.
47. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §13.11 (2d ed. 1948); Comm., Effect
of Statute of Limitations on Riglit to Assert Counterclaim, 3 Fed. Rules
Serv. 688 (1940). The old Minnesota law was to the same effect. 2 Pirsig's
Dunnell §1809.
48. See Minn. R. C. P. 18.01. Under the Code a counterclaim in the
reply could only be used defensively. 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §1588.

49. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §13.08 (2d ed. 1948) ; Advisory Comm.
Note 4 to Rule 13.02.
r
50. Maurin v. Lyon, 69 Minn. 257, 72 N.%N
. 72 (1897).
51. Abraham v. Selig, 29 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. N.Y. 1939) ; 7 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 394 (1940).
52. General Casualty Co of America v. Fedoff, 11 F. R. D. 177 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951).
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tees a counterclaim will not lie against them individually,5 3 and that
in a suit against the administrator of an estate he need not assert a
claim, otherwise compulsory, for wrongful death, since he is sued as
administrator for the benefit of creditors and distributees, while the
wrongful death claim is for the benefit of the persons designated by
the statute? '- Nonetheless, as at least one defendant has found to his
sorrow, the rule is not clear even in this area. This defendant was
sued for having caused the death of a truckdriver, the action being
brought by the driver's employer, as assignee of the widow's death
claim. Subsequently defendant sought to sue the employer for damages caused defendant by the negligence of the deceased driver acting in the scope of the employer's business. The court held, under
the Florida compulsory counterclaim statute, that this second
action was barred, since the claim should have been asserted as a
counterclaim in the first suit.55 The court rests its decision on the
ground that the different capacities of the employer on the claim and
on the counterclaim would have caused little difficulty, while allowing two actions is contrary to the legislative purpose to dispose of
all claims from a single accident in one suit. I think this is an example of the thesis I advanced early in this article, that the philosophy of the joinder rules often provides answers where the rules
themselves do not. The philosophy would dictate here, as elsewhere,
that related claims be joined, and that the court order separate
trials if confusion will otherwise result. I think this philosophy
offers a sure guide to the otherwise difficult problem of varying
capacities.
JOINDER OF CROSS-CLAIMS

Under the Code Minnesota courts were authorized to determine
the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between themselves
"when justice so requires," ' and in practice this was interpreted
as meaning that the court should determine the claims among the
parties on the same side where these claims were "arising out of,
7
or having reference to, the subject of the original action."5' The
new rule on cross-claims, Rule 13.07, has formalized this procedure, and has made the assertion of a cross-claim a right of the
53. Chambers v. Cameron, 29 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. IIl. 1939). And see
3 Moore's Federal Practice §13.06 (2d ed. 1948) ; Clark on Code Pleading
671-672 (2d ed. 1947).
54. Campbell v.Ashler, 320 Mass. 475, 70 N. E. 2d 302 (1946), disapproved 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 446 (1948).
55. Newton v. Mitchell, 42 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1949), approved 4 Miami
L. Q. 251 (1950).
56. Minn. Stat. §548.02 (1949).
871 (1926).
57. Kewitsch v. Beer, 168 Minn. 165, 209 N. N1V.
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party, rather than leaving it in the discretion of the court, but the
crucial test remains much the same as before. Cross-claims may now
be raised when they arise out of the "transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein" or if the claim is one "relating to any property that
is' the subject matter of the original claim." This last clause is
something rather new: it will allow, for example, a second mortgagee who is named as a party defendant in a foreclosure action to
cross-claim against the mortgagor to get a personal judgment for
his debt, even though this debt does not arise from the same transaction as the first mortgage. 58 But other than this provision there
is little about this rule which should be new to a Minnesota lawyer.
Where a cross-claim is made it is subject to the same rules as
any other pleading. Since the defendant on the cross-claim now
becomes an opposing party to -he cross-claimant, the usual rules on
counterclaims will apply: the defendant must counterclaim against
the cross-claimant on any claim arising out of the transaction which
is the subject matter of the cross-claim, and he may plead as a
counterclaim any other claim which he has.
The cross-claim, like any other pleading, must contain "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." 5 9 Consider the various possibilities which may arise in
a tort action against two defendants: if the parties are jointly
liable, one of them may cross-claim against the other for contribution60-- the rule specifically provides that a cross-claim will lie if the
party against whom it is asserted "is or may be liable to the crossclaimant for all or part" of "the original plaintiff's claim. If one
of the parties is only secondarily liable, he may cross-claim against
the primarily liable defendant for indemnity against any amount he
may have to pay-the demand for indemnification is a "claim for
relief."861 But finally there is the situation, quite frequently encountered now that joinder in the alternative is permissible, where
one defendant wishes to assert that he is blameless and that his codefendant is solely liable. In this circumstance a cross-claim will not
be permissible, since it asks -or no relief from the party against
whom it is asserted." Facts which show that the would-be cross58. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §13.34 (2d ed. 1948).
59. Minn. R. C. P. 8.01.
60. Cf. Kemerer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239,
245, 276 N. W. 228, 231 (1937).
61. Brown v. Commerce Trust Co., 9 F. R. D. 317 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
62. Washington Building Realty Corp. v. People's Drug Stores Inc.,
161 F. 2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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claimant is blameless will be a complete defense as to him, but they
raise no issue between him and the other defendant.
The availability of the cross-claim to litigate claims against a
fellow defendant puts to rest procedural questions which had been
raised by two decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasizing the rule that the judgments for or against each of the defendants
in their contest with the original plaintiff may be binding upon them
in a subsequent suit among themselves for contribution or indemnity.0 1' A defendant may now guard against the possibility that his
fellow defendant will win in the original action, and thus be immune
from a later suit for contribution or indemnity, because of failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute his claim with sufficient vigor, by crossclaiming and presenting his own evidence to show that the other
defendant is primarily liable or that there is common liability. Indeed
while Rule 13.07 is permissive in terms the possibility that a verdict
for the co-defendant will become the law of the case, or show an
absence of common liability, will probably be enough to compel
a defendant, for his own protection, to file a cross-claim where he
has any notion of later seeking contribution or indemnity. 4
63. The decisions, American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn.
120, 5 N. W. 2d 397 (1942), and Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis
Brewing Co., 214 Minn. 436, 8 N. W. 2d 471 (1943), were sharply criticized
when they were handed down. See Note, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 519 (1943) ; 2
Pirsig's Dunnell §1979. The criticism was partly because the decisions
seemed to rest on a notion of res judiata more broad than that applied
elsewhere, and partly because they held that parties were bound on issues
which, because of the absence of appropriate procedural machinery, they
could not possibly have litigated among themselves in the original suit. Rule
13.07 meets the second objection by providing the procedural machinery for
the parties to litigate their claims for contribution or indemnity in the same

action in which they are being sued, and our Court, in an extremely recent
decision, Bunge v. Yager, 52 N. W. 2d 466 (Minn. Sup. Ct. March 21,
1952), has met the first objection by explaining that the cases in question
didn't turn on res judicata after all. The court explains the Vigen case,
where a favorable verdict for the co-defendant in the original action was held

to bar a later suit for contribution, by saying that the first action establishes the co-defendant's non-liability to plaintiff, and thus the common liability necessary for contribution is gone. The charge of the trial court in

the Fidelity case, to the effect that both defendants were involved in active
negligence and thus joint tortfeasors, is now said to have established the
"law of the case," and on this basis, rather than res judicata, it bars a later
contention by one of the parties that he was only secondarily liable and
therefore should have indemnity. In its latest pronouncement the court also
tells us that it "need not now determine" whether the earlier decisions "are
sound." While it thus leaves open possibilities of further confusion in the
contribution and indemnity situations, it has at least made it clear that res
judicataexercises no effect between co-parties in other situations.
64. Note, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 519 (1943), argues that even if there were
procedural machinery for litigating claims between co-parties, the result in
the Vigcn and Fidelity cases, discussed note 63 supra, cannot be correct,
because "cross-claims are uniformly optional and not compulsory" Id. at
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The phrase "is or may be liable" in Rule 13.07 has other important consequences. As will be discussed more fully in connection
with the impleader rule, 65 it allows an acceleration of the determination of liability. Suppose that an insurance company brings suit
for a declaratory judgment of non-liability against its insured and
a person whom he has injured. The injured person may crossclaim against the plaintiff insurer and the defendant insured to
recover for his injuries, so long as the injury itself and the insurer's
claim of non-liability arise from the same "transaction or occur'
rence."66
The "no action" clause in the insurance policy is no bar
to the cross-claim: in part because the "may be liable" clause of
Rule 13.07 is intended to accelerate the determination of liability ;"in part because a court will not "administer justice piecemeal, by
extending its facilities to one party to an action and denying them
to another." 68 Not even great insurance companies can eat their
cake and have it too.
Although Rule 13.07 allows a cross-claim only against "a coparty," additional parties may be ordered in if necessary to give
complete relief on the cross-c'-aim.69 And the former right of the
court in its discretion not to allow a cross-claim where the litigation
between the co-defendants might delay, and thereby prejudice, the
original plaintiff,70 is substantially preserved by the authority to
528. I suggest that this begs the question. The substantive doctrines of law
of the case, and of common liability as a prerequisite for contribution, do
not turn on the form of procedural rules. I would favor making crossclaims compulsory, in order to preverft multiplicity of suits in the situations
where the substantive doctrines do not provide the needed measure of compulsion, but the failure of procedural draftsmen to go this far cannot be used
as an argument for encouraging multiplicity where hitherto it would have
been barred by the substantive law.
65. See pp. 614-621 below.
66. Thus if the company claims it is not liable because its insured was
acting outside the scope of the policy when he inflicted the injury, the crossclaim clearly comes from the same "transaction or occurrence." But if the
company's action is to cancel the policy because of fraud in its procurement,
the injury comes from a separate transaction, and the cross-claim will not
lie. Hoosier Casualty Co. of Indianapolis v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D.
Iowa 1952).
67. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §§13.34, 14.08 (2d ed. 1948).
68. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Janich, 3 F. R. D. 16, 18
(S.D. Calif. 1943). This dicta in the Hoosier Casualty case, note 66 supra,
is not inconsistent with this. For there the Federal court was obliged to apply
Iowa law, and the Iowa Rule which otherwise corresponds to Minn. R. C. P.
18.02-see p. 585 above-has the added provision: "But there shall be no
joinder of an action against an indemnitor or insurer with one against the
indemnified party, unless a statute so provides."
69. Minn. R. C. P. 13.08.
70. Thus compare O'Connor v. Pawling & Harnischfeger Co., 185 Wis.
226, 201 N.W. 393 (1924), with Liebhauser v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. &
Light Co., 180 Wis. 468, 193 N. W. 522 (1922). See 3 Wis. L. Rev. 289
(1925).
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judgments "in furtherance of
order separate trials and give separate
71
convenience or to avoid prejudice."
JOINDER OF PARTIES

Make no mistake about it, joinder of parties can be tough. Although the new rules offer solutions more effective and simple than
anything which had gone before, even they leave some difficult
problems unsolved. It's not surprising that this should be the case:
where joinder of claims is involved you have, usually, only one
party on each side, and there are no good arguments against bringing in at that time as many matters as they have in dispute. But
when you turn to joinder of parties two new factors enter in. On
the one hand, it is undesirable to bring a party into a lawsuit in
which he has absolutely no interest; this demands that there be
some limit on permissive joinder. On the other hand, it is undesirable to decide matters which will affect a person unless he is a
party to the lawsuit; this demands that in some situations joinder
be made compulsory.
Compulsory Joinder
To understand what parties must be joined we must examine
the distinctions between "indispensable," "necessary," and "proper"
parties. These distinctions are well known to the Minnesota Court,
although, as has usually been the case in state courts, there has been
some confusion in terminology. 72 It will be most useful for our purpose to define these labels in terms of the results which follow when
they are applied; the labels have meaning only in terms of the
procedural results to which they give rise, and to seek to define
them without reference to these results would lead to a barren conceptualism. "Indispensable parties" are those who must be joined
or the action will be dismissed. "Necessary parties" are those who
must be joined if they are within the jurisdiction of the court; if
they are without the jurisdiction of the court, the action can proceed
despite their' nonjoinder.7 3 "Proper parties" are those who may
permissibly be joined, but who need not be joified even though
they are within the jurisdiction of the court.
We can now proceed to decide which label to apply to a particular party. If a person has "a joint interest which is not also a
several interest" 74 he is either an indispensable or a necessary
71.
72.
73.
74.

Miinn.
See 2
Minn.
Minn.

R. C. P.
Pirsig's
R. C. P.
R. C. P.

42.02,13.09.
Dunnell §1883; 29 Calif. L. Rev. 731 (1941).
19.02.
19.01.
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party; if he is united with the existing parties only by a several
interest, or by common question of law or of fact, he is a proper
party. Or to put it in another, and less technical way, "persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to
be made parties, in order that the court may . . . decide on, and
finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice,
'
by adjusting all the rights in it"'
are either indispensable or necessary parties. Some specific examples may make this clearer: joint
obligors are proper parties, for a statute provides that their liability
is both joint and several.7 6 Similarly joint tortfeasors are merely
proper parties, since their liability is several.7 7 By way of comparison, in an action to reform a contract or to cancel a deed all
the parties to the contract7 or deed79 are necessary or indispensable,
since they are jointly interested in the outcome of the litigation and
since a decree in the suit will affect them. The distinction, then,
between proper parties on the one hand and necessary or indispensable parties on the other is not too difficult: is the party so closely
connected with the matters in question that, for his own protection,
we should require him to be joined, if possible?
The distinction between necessary and indispensable parties
is quite another matter. And necessarily so, for here neither the
nature of the interest nor the niceties of common law history furnish
the guide. The United States Supreme Court has defined indispensable parties this way:
"Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy,
but an interest of such a hature that a final decree cannot be
made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and in good conscience."80
"Good conscience" is hardly a term of art, and while the quoted
definition is useful for explaining the decision in a particular case
it is of little help in reaching the decision. And the criteria offered in
a later Federal case, though they give an illusion of greater certainty, are probably in practice little more helpful:
"(1) Is the interest of the absent party distinct and severable? (2) In the absence of such party, can the court render
75. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 136 (1854).
76. Minn. Stat. §548.20 (1949).
77. Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N.W. 764 (1920) ; Mason
v. Dullagham, 82 Fed. 1689 (7th Cir. 1897); Prosser on Torts 1096-1102

(1941).
78. Disbrow v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 104 Minn. 17, 115 N. W.
751 (1908); Disbrow Mfg. Co. v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 115 Minn.
434, 132 N. W. 913 (1911).
79. Dose v. Dose, 172 Minn. 145, 214 N. W. 769 (1927).

80. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 139 (1854).
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justice between the parties before it? (3) Will the decree made,
in the absence of such party, have no injurious effect on the
interest of such absent party? (4) Will the final determination,
in the absence of such party, be consistent with equity and good
conscience?
"If, after the court determines that an absent party is interested in the controversy, it finds that all of the four questions
outlined above are answered in the affirmative with respect to
the absent party's interest, then such absent party is a necessary
party. However, if any one of the four questions is answered in
the negative, then the absent party is indispensable."s'Still one returns to such concepts as "justice, ....
equity," and
"good conscience." And this is inevitable. For what is really involved here is the desire of the courts, on the one hand, to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and to give parties their day in court before
making decisions that affect their interest, while on the other hand
is the courts' desire to make some judgment, if it is at all possible,
rather than leaving the parties without a remedy because, in some
Utopia where all the parties could be ordered in, a better decision
might be reached. All one can do in a specific case is balance these
conflicting desires. 12 Perhaps one example will give a suggestion as
to how this balance is made. The beneficiaries of a trust are necessary, but not indispensable, in an action to remove the trustee for
misconduct," 3 as are the heirs under a will in an action to construe
the will, " or in an action to impose a constructive trust on the
various legacies. 85 On the other hand, in a suit by a remainderman
under a trust to establish his interest in stock dividends the life
tenant is an indispensable party, 8 and all the beneficiaries under a
s
will are indispensable parties in an action to set aside the will. 7
Consideration of the varying results in these five somewhat similar
cases will give some insight into how the courts balance the interests
in determining whether a party is necessary or indispensable. 88
81. State of Washington v. United States, 87 F. 2d 421, 427-428 (9th
Cir. 1936).
82. "There is no prescribed formula for determining in every- case
whether a person or corporation is an indispensable party." Niles-BementPond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, 254 U. S. 77, 80 (1920). And see 2
Pirsig's Dunnell §1885: ". . . the questions raised by joinder of parties must
be determined with respect to the facts of the individual case."
83. Wesson v. Crain, 165 F. 2d 6 (8th Cir. 1948).
84. De Korwin v.First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 156 F. 2d 858 (7th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 795 (1946).
85. Bank of California Nat. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516,
106 P. 2d 879 (1940), an unusually scholarly and helpful opinion.
86. Franz v. Buder, 11 F. 2d 854 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273
U. S. 756 (1927) ; cf. Wood v. Honeyman, 178 Ore. 484, 169 P. 2d 131 (1946).
87. Young v. Meyers, 124 Ohio St. 448, 179 N. E. 358 (1931).
88. Beyond such a general insight the only source for more specific
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If a party is necessary only, and he is not within reach of the
court, the plaintiff must set forth the missing party's name in the
complaint, and explain why he hasn't been joined. 9 If a party who
should join as plaintiff refuses to do so, and service of process can
be had on him, he must be joined as a defendant.", If a necessary
or indispensable party has not been joined the existing parties may
point out the defect by motion or in the responsive pleading"' and
the court shall order them summoned into the action. 2 If the missing party is-not within reach of the court's process, and he is indispensable, the action must be dismissed,93 whereas in this situation
if he is only a necessary party, the court has discretion to proceed
without him. 94 Failure to join a necessary party is waived unless
one of the existing parties points out the defect, 95 whereas lack of
an indispensable party runs to the very power of the court to decide
the case; it is, therefore, not waived9" and may even be raised by an
appellate court on its own motion if it has not been previously
97

considered.

Permissive Joinder

There are few developments in all of the law, and certainly none
in the limited field of procedural reform, as instructive and as
grotesque as the struggle to achieve sensible and workable provisions for permissive joinder of parties. In New York, a particularly
horrible example, it took four successive statutory reforms to reach
a goal which had been clear 100 years before when David Dudley
Field and his associates first went to work. All this effort was required, furthermore, despite experience in England which pointed
out the exact pitfalls to be avcided.
I do not feel justified in taking the space to describe this comedy
of errors in detail 9s because the mistakes which other states have
answers is the voluminous and perceptive analysis of many kinds of cases
at 3 Moore's Federal Practice §§19.07-19.14, 19.18 (2d ed. 1948). Note, Indispesable Parties in the Federal Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1050 (1952).
89. Minn. R. C. P. 19.03.
90. Minn. R. C. P. 19.01
91. Minn. R. C. P. 12.02.
92. Minn. R. C. P. 19.02.
93. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §19.05(2) (2d ed. 1948).
94. Minn. R. C. P. 19.02.
95. Minn. R. C. P. 12.08; Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., Inc., 140 F. 2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944).
96. Minn. R. C. P. 12.08. See 3 Moore's Federal Practice §§19.05(2),
12.23 (2d ed. 1948).
97. Hoe v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 501 (1869); Flynn v. Brooks, 105 F. 2d
766 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
98. The sordid story is told in Clark and Wright, The Judicial Council
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made have been avoided in Minnesota. They were avoided by an
enviably simple technique; Minnesota did not accept the Code provisions for permissive joinder or parties, and made no attempt to
improve on the restrictive rules of the common law 99 until 1952.
Then the Federal Rule on the subject, which had been carefully
drafted to avoid the mistakes made elsewhere, and which had
shown in 13 years of use that it was successful in this attempt, was
incorporated into the state practice as Rule 20.01.
The distinctions made in the preceding section of this article
between "proper" parties and "necessary" and "indispensable" parties are still relevant. When we come to permissive joinder we are
interested only in "proper" parties; thus, as suggested before,
joinder is permissive only as to those whose interests are joint and
several, or several only. 100 But this is not the limit of the class of
"proper" parties, for the rule provides that persons may be joined
even though they have no common interests, in the technical sense,
provided that there is asserted either for or against them any right
to relief "in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
fact or law common to all of them will arise in the action."''1 1 Thus
joinder of the two persons injured in the same collision, discussed
at the beginning of this article, is clearly proper, although they
have no common interest. Their respective rights to relief arise
from the same transaction or occurrence-the collision-and there
is a question of law or fact common to both of them, namely "Was
defendant negligent ?"02 And the absurd Minnesota rule that tortfeasors could be joined if their acts caused a single injury, but not
where they had acted independently and each had caused some
damage to which the other did not contribute, 10 3 is gone. Under this
rule a plaintiff, whose lungs had been damaged by poisonous fumes
in the plant where he worked, was not allowed to join the two
persons who had owned the premises and employed him during
and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and a Protest, 1 Syracuse L. Rev.
346, 357-359 (1950).

99. 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §1861.
100. See pp. 597-598 above.
101. Minn. R. C. P. 20.01.
102. Joinder was allowed in this situation in Thomson v. United Glazing Co., 36 F. Supp. 527 (W.D. N.Y. 1941). Indeed I don't believe that
there could be any question about the propriety of such joinder under the
new rules.
103. 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §1870.
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different parts of the period in question. 10 4 Today, under Rule
20.01, a court would approach the problem this way: employment
in one plant by successive owners is surely a "series of transactions or occurrences" if, indeed, it is not a single transaction.
Thus the first test of 20.01 is met. And there is a question of fact,
"did the fumes in the plant cause the damage to plaintiff's lungs,"
common to both defendants. Thus the joinder would be allowed
and plaintiff could get a judgment for the full amount of damage
to him, letting the defendants fight between themselves as to the
proportion of the damage which each of them caused. This result
is not merely a procedural improvement, by allowing one suit to
do the job for which two might formerly have been required. It is
a distinct substantive advantage to plaintiff to proceed against both
employers at one time. Under the former practice where he was
forced to bring separate suits each defendant would doubtless
argue to the jury-and might well convince it-that the real damage was caused during the employment by the other owner.Y1 3
104. McGannon v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 160 Minn. 143, 199 N. W.
894 (1924). See also Johnson v. Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N. 1V. 572
(1933), where joinder was denied of two factories, each of which deposited

substances in a stream which combined to give the stream an offensive odor
when it passed plaintiff's land.
105. A pat example of this is presented by Way v. Waterloo, C. F. & N.
R. R., 239 Iowa 244, 29 N. W. 2d 867 (1947), 27 Neb. L. Rev. 590 (1948),
decided under rules, so far as here relevant, identical to the new Minnesota
rules. A railroad employee had been killed in a collision between a train and

a truck of the Foley Trucking Co. His executrix joined the railroad and
Foley in her wrongful death action, and the trial court, pursuant to the
Iowa equivalent of Minn. R. C. P. 42.02, ordered separate trials as to each
defendant. In the action against the trucker, the jury found for the defendant.
On appeal, the Court held that it was an abuse of discretion to have ordered
separate trials, saying, at 257-258, 29 N. W. 2d at 874:
"We are not unmindful of the fact that the railroad will possibly be
at some disadvantage in the joint trial .... We suspect the chief disadvantage will be the inabilily in a joint trial to shift the entire responsibility upon the other co-defendant.... The record here shows that
the defendant Foley took full advantage of the situation presented by
the severance. It was brought out that the plaintiff had a suit pending
against the railroad for $50,0(0 damages for the death of Mr. Beckner
in this accident. The argument to the jury by Foley's counsel is set forth
in the record. .

.

. Counsel's remarks were well within the rules of

legitimate inference drawn from testimony in the case. But the argument does illustrate the terrific disadvantage in which plaintiff was
placed by the severance. Counsel's argument in defense of Foley consisted in the main of a scathing denunciation of the railroad and a charge
of negligence on the part of the railroad that was the sole cause of the
accident. The plaintiff, who admittedly had a suit for $50,000 pending
against the railroad for the death of Mr. Beckner, was forced to defend
the railroad to some extent or at least argue that its negligence was
not the sole cause of the accident .... Plaintiff should not, in a forced
separation, be put to the hazard of two juries, each believing the absent
tort-feasor the wrongdoer."
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Minnesota long ago reached the conclusion, on the express
ground of "the orderly administration of justice," that a master
and servant might be joined in a tort action although the liability
of the master was statutory while that of the servant rose from
the common law. 10 6 Such joinder, of course, is still proper under
the new rules,' 07 which are not concerned with such perplexities
as the nature or source of defendants' duties. Similarly in jurisdictions which require common carriers to carry liability insurance ' 8 the injured person has been allowed to join the insurer
and the carrier as defendant, whether the liability of the insurer
0
09
be considered a statutory tort liability' or a contract liability."1
Among the most important changes which Rule 20.01 makes
in Minnesota practice is its specific permission for joinder of either
plaintiffs or defendants in the alternative. Our court has refused
to allow joinder of two defendants where plaintiff claims that one
of them converted his goods but he doesn't know which one did
it."' x Nor, where plaintiff was uncertain whether an agent had
been acting within the scope of his agency in executing a note,
was he allowed to claim alternatively against the agent and the
principal."11- The proposition that a complaint "that one or the other
of the defendants is liable, but plaintiff does not know which one
3
may be
. .states no cause of action against either defendant""
impressive rhetoric but it is ridiculous law. In the converse situation, where a person holds a sum of money but is uncertain to
whom he should pay it, it has long been commonplace to allow
interpleader and make the various claimants fight among themselves. Why, then, shouldn't a plaintiff who knows one of two persons is liable to him be given a similar right to bring them both
106. Mayberry v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 79, 110 N. W.
356 (1907).
107. Johnson v. Rudolph, 3 Fed. Rules Senr. 20a.12, case 1 (D. D.C.
1940) (citing the Mayberry case, note 106 supra) ; Drake v. Hodges, 114
Colo. 10, 161 P. 2d 338 (1945) (applying Colo. R. C. P. 20a, which is practically identical with Minn. R. C. P. 20.01).
108. As does Minnesota, Mim. Stat. §221.10 (1949). Whether the
language of this statute is such as to allow any action against the insurer
until judgment has been had against the carrier seems not to have been
decided.
109. Fitzgerald v. Thompson, 167 Kan. 87, 204 P. 2d 756 (1949).
110. Grier v. Ferrant, 62 Cal. App. 2d 306, 144 P. 2d 631 (1944), 32
Calif. L. Rev. 202, 39 Ill.
L. Rev. 81 ; Hudson v. Ketchum, 156 Kan. 332, 133
P. 2d 171 (1943) (perhaps qualified by the Fitzgerald case, note 109 supra);
James v. Young, 43 N. W. 2d 692 (N.D. 1950).
111. Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co., 124 Minn. 117, 144
N. W. 450 (1913).
112. Pilney v. Funk, 212 Minn. 398, 3 N. V. 2d 792 (1942).
113. Id. at 402, 3 N. W. 2d at 795.
*
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in and make them fight the issue, in which plaintiff has no interest,
as to which is liable? That there is no good answer to such a question is indicated by Rule 20.01, which allows just such a procedure.
Indeed, perhaps the classic case to illustrate modern permissive
joinder of parties turns on joinder in the alternative. An office
supply company had contracted to sell to a particular customer time
cards meeting special specifications. It then contracted with a manufacture to purchase such time cards from it. When the cards were
shipped, the customer refused to pay for them, claiming that they
failed to meet the required specifications. The supply company
then sued the customer and the manufacturer, demanding the price
from the customer, or in the alternative, damages for breach of
contract in not meeting the specifications from the manufacturer.
This case presents one common question: "Did the goods furnished
by the manufacturer conform to the specifications ?" If they did,
then the customer must pay the price. If they did not, then the
manufacturer has breached his contract. No matter how many other
questions may appear in the case this common question is fundamental, and the court properly allowed the joinder."1 Every
instinct for procedural economy and simplicity compels applause
for the decision, and for its codification in Rule 20.01.
Multiple Clains and M1ultiple Parties
More complicated problems arise when it is sought to join both
multiple parties and multiple claims. The new rules present only
two clues to the solution of such problems. By express provision""
they negate the code requirement": 6 that all the causes of actionor claims-joined must affect all the parties. And Rule 18.01,
which allows unlimited joinder of claims where one plaintiff is
suing one defendant, provides:
"There may be a like joinder of claims when there are
multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22
are satisfied."
The most important decision construing these rules was the
early case of Federal Housing Administrator v. Christianson,'"
decided by one of the ablest judges on the Federal bench. In that
case plaintiff held two promissory notes, both of which had been
made and endorsed to him the same day. Three persons, whom he
joined as defendants, were liable to him on one of the notes, while
114. Payne v. British Time Recorder Co., [1921] 2 K. B. 1 (C.A.). See
Comm., Alternative Joinder of Parties, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 700 (1940).
115. Minn. R. C. P. 20.01.
116. Minn. Stat. §544.27 (1949).
117. 26 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1939).
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two of the same three people were liable on the other note. The
court found that under Rules 18 and 20 this was misjoinder,
saying:
"Clearly there is no common question of fact involved here.
For each note necessarily involves a separate question of fact.
Nor, I hold, is there here involved a common question of law.
For under the first count the only questions of law relate to the
liability of the three defendants upon the first note and under
the second count the only questions of law relate to the liability
of the two defendants upon the second note. Whether the same
general principles of law are applicable is no part of the prescribed test. To rule otherwise would in effect permit a creditor,
such as a bank, to bring a single action against all debtors
whose obligations arose out of promissory notes, upon the
theory that a common question of law was involved."" 18
Although this decision enjoys the weighty approval of Professor
Moore,' and, as will be seen, has support in the case law, I suggest, with deference, that it is unsound both in its reasoning and
in its result.
The reasoning of Christianson is subject to criticism on two
different levels. First, while we are greatly handicapped-by the
decision's failure to state fully the facts, it seems likely that the
case did present common questions of law or fact. So far as questions of law go, judge Hincks seems to suppose that the only question on each note is, "Are the defendants liable on this note?" This
is far too narrow a view. The "common question of law" test of
Rule 20.01 must relate to those very "general principles of law"
which the judge refuses to consider. Otherwise there could never
be a common question of law except where a joint right or liability
is involved, since on Hinck's view the only question of law would
be: "Is defendant liable to plaintiff A ?" and "Is defendant liable
to plaintiff B?", or "Is defendant X liable?" and "Is defendant
118. Ibid.
119. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §18.04(3) (2d ed. 1948). The view as

to when joinder of multiple claims and multiple parties is permissible which
the Christianson case exemplifies, and which is criticized in the succeeding
text, is shared also, though without any reasoned discussion, by Blume and
Reed, Pleading and Joinder 380, 425 (1952). The learned Messrs. Barron &
Holtzoff have no very clear idea of what they think on this issue. They quote
from the Christianson case as representing the law on joinder of plaintiffs
(sic), 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §532 p. 104
(1950), though a page before they have stated that the questions of law or
fact must be common to the parties, not to the claims joined. This is the
correct view, I think, but it is exactly opposite to what Christianson says.
And at §533 they manage to sit on the fence with a beautiful zig-zag sentence which says in its opening clause that the right to relief against each
party must relate to the same transaction, etc., but which says in its concluding clause, in effect, that there are cases the other way.
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Y liable ?" Thus suppose that a number of persons who have been
individually induced, by means of a fraudulent prospectus, to invest
their money in a sham corporation wish to join in one action against
the promoters of the corporation for fraud. Judge Hincks would
rule that as to each of these plaintiffs there is a different question
of law, namely: "Are defendants liable to this plaintiff for fraud ?"
Yet such a construction would negate the remedial purpose of the
rule, and in fact when that very case arose, a distinguished court,
in an opinion which makes a discriminating analysis of the meaning of the phrase "any common question of law or fact," held the
joinder proper. 12 0 One must keep in mind the purpose of Rule
20.01. It is intended to abandon the technical legal tests which
the common law and the Code made so important, and to put an
end to the wasteful practice of litigating similar issues over and
over again in different law suits. Suppose that under a particular
set of circumstances it is doubtful whether a person is a holder
in due course, and that both of the notes indorsed over to plaintiff in the Christianson case were taken by him in such circumstances. In that case it would seem to me clear that there is a question of law common to both claims: "Is a person who takes under
these circumstan6es a holder in due course?"
But that whole issue is made academic by a more fundamental
error in the Christianson reasoning, and it is here, particularly,
that I take issue with Professor Moore. That learned author says
that in the Christianson situation:
".t. . joinder of the different claims would be proper if
the claims arose out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences, and if there was a question
of law or fact which knit them together." [Italics added.]1
Since Judge Hincks saw fit to examine whether there was a
question common to both claims, patently he was construing the
interrelationship of Rules 18 and 20 in the same way that Moore
does. But I suggest that the language of the rules indicates quite
clearly that this construction is erroneous. Rule 18, it will be
recalled, says that the same complete freedom on joinder which
exists in the one plaintiff-one defendant situation may be had
where there are multiple parties if the requirements of the rules
on joinder of parties are met. The test of joinder of parties here
relevant is that which allows joinder of the parties "if any question
120. Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924).
121. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §18.04(3), p. 1811 (2d ed. 1948)
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of fact or law common to all of them will arise in the action.

1 2-

2

The

word "them" here does not refer to claims sought to be joined,
since the rule is drafted principally with regard to suits in which
only one claim is involved. Instead it refers to the parties who are
to be joined. What Judge Hincks and Professor M\1oore have done is
to read the "common question" test as if it referred to the claims,
and thus, in effect, to put a restriction on joinder of claims which
Rule 18.01 does not contain. All that the rules require is any question common to all the parties ;123 plainly whatever questions are involved in the note on which all three of the Christiansondefendants
were sued are common to all of them, and thus this test of joinder
was met here.
Much the same objection may be made to the contention of
Moore-not discussed in the Christianson case-that the claims
must have arisen out of the same transaction or occurrence. Rule 18
makes no such requirement as to joinder of claims. The "same
transaction" test comes from Rule 20.01, which allows parties to
be joined if there is asserted for or against them "any right to relief
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences ....,1 Even by itself this is a
far cry from saying that all claims for relief must arise from the
same transaction. And this must be read in connection with the later
sentence in the same rule providing: "A plaintiff or defendant need
not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief
demanded." Now in Christiansonthere was a right to relief asserted
against all the defendants growing out of the first note. This should
be enough to satisfy the test, and it is then immaterial whether
the second note is a part of the same series of transactions.
The result in Christiansoncan now be re-evaluated. All three
defendants were properly joined in the claim on the first note, since
the right to relief asserted against them came from one transaction
and presented questions of law and fact common to all of them. A
second claim is then made against two of these three defendants; can
122. Minn. R. C. P. 20.01. Federal Rule 20(a), under which the
Christianson case was decided, is identical save that "fact" and "law" are
transposed.
123. "If multiple parties are involved and their joinder is authorized
by the rules governing joinder of parties, the road to joinder is clear, as
there is no obstacle of any kind in the rule which governs joinder of claims."
Blume, Free Joinder of Parties, Claims and Counterclaims, Jud. Admin.
Monographs, Series A, No. 11, p. 13 (A.B.A., 1941). The same conclusion
is reached in the closely reasoned Commentary, Relation Between Joinder
of Partiesand Joinder of Claims, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 822 (1942).
124. Again the differences between the 'Minnesota rule and F. R. C. P.
20(a) are merely in the order of words.

1
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it be litigated in the same suit or must it be severed and proceeded
on separately? The specific provision which makes it unimportant
that the third defendant is not interested in defending against the
relief asked on the second note seems to me a complete answer
to the question. This provision is also a complete answer if the
problem is approached another way. Suppose that plaintiff had
chosen to proceed on both notes against only the two defendants
who were liable on both. Everyone agrees that in this case he
could join his claims on the two notes, no matter how unrelated
they were, 125 just as in a suit against a single defendant a multitude
of unrelated claims may be joined. Does this perfectly proper
joinder of claims become improper when the third defendant is
brought in to answer to the one claim in which he was interested?
The construction that it does flies squarely in the face of the
language and the purpose of Rule 20.01.
I conceded at the outset of this discussion that the Christianson
holding has support in the case law, and it is now time to examine
the extent of that support. One point should be made immediately:
the cases on this proposition, both those which support Christianson
and those which are more favorable to my view, are uniformly
devoid of any reasoned discussion of this joinder issue. Commonly
they quote a phrase from Rule 20, state the result which they have
reached in the particular case, and let it go at that.
To begin with, I have found no case which presents a clear
holding supporting my view. Such a case would be one in which the
joinder is allowed where there is a question of law or fact common
to all the parties, and some right of relief urged for or against all
the parties arising from the same transaction or occurrence, but
in which the claims do not arise from the same transaction and
present a common question. There is one case 125 in which the first
of these tests is met, and I would think the joinder proper, but in
which the absence of any indication as to the nature of the claims
makes it impossible to tell whether Judge Hincks and Professor
125. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §18.04(3), p. 1812 (2d ed. 1948) ("no
question of misjoinder") ; Comm., Relation Between Joinder of Parties and
Joinder of Claims, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 822, 825 (1942); Atlantic Lumber
Corp. v. Southern Pacific Co., 2 F. R. D. 313 (D. Ore. 1941). The case of
F. X. Hooper Co. Inc. v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 56 F. Supp. 577 (D.
N.J. 1944), criticised 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 438 (1945), seems clearly wrong
in its holding that joinder of claims is improper where both defendants were
liable on each claim.
126. Callinan v. Federal Cash Register Co., 3 F. R. D. 177 (W.D. Mo.
1942) (joinder allowed of claim against 3 defendants for fraud and a claim
against 2 of the 3 for money had and received).
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Moore would not also allow the joinder. Also favorable to my
view, but not conclusive, are the cases in which courts have allowed
joinder for stated reasons I think sound, but in which, while
the court doesn't mention it, the claims do arise from the same
transaction and involve a common question, so that the HincksMoore test also would be satisfied."2 No help one way or the other
can be drawn from the cases in which joinder was denied where
it would be improper either by the Hincks-Moore test or by my
test;1201 that is, where there is no question common either to all the
parties or all the claims, or there is no right to relief urged for or
against all the parties arising from the same transaction.
Next come a group of cases which have the force of dicta against
my theory and in favor of the Hincks-Moore test ;"3 these are the
127. Indeed 3 Moore's Federal Practice §18.04(3) n. 19 (2d ed. 1948)
cites the Callinan case, note 126 mtpra, in support of its position, but there is
nothing said in the case which justifies such citation of it. And the statement
at Clark, Cases on Modern Pleading 910 (1952) that ". . . it appears that
in this case the test suggested ... [in the Christiansoncase] . . . of a common question involved in all the claims would be satisfied" now seems to me
to have been ill-advised.
128. Hopper v. Lennen & Mitchell, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Cal.
1943) (joinder allowed of two claims against both defendants with one
claim each against the separate individuals) ; Thomas v. Moore, [1918] 1 K. B.
555 (C.A. 1917) (joinder allowed of separate claims against each of the
defendants for different slanders with a claim against all defendants for
conspiracy to slander); Teeter v. Los Angeles, 209 Cal. 689, 290 Pac. 11
(1930) (joinder allowed of claim against the city to rescind an easement for
street construction given it by plaintiff, with a claim against the city and its
contractor for an injunction against building the street). Although in all of
these the Hincks-Moore test could have been met, in the Thomas and Teeter
cases the courts rested their decisions on the rule that all defendants need
not be interested in all the relief demanded, which seems to me the proper
ground for decision.
129. Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939) (joinder not allowed, though
questions of law and fact common to all defendants, because there is no
claim-nor claims arising from the same transaction--on which all defendants are joined) ; Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., 99 F. Supp. 886
(N.D. Ill. 1951) (a number of plaintiffs could not join individual claims
under the anti-trust laws, since there is no right to relief in favor of all
arising from the same series of transactions) ; Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (9th ed.) 62,928 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (to the same
effect as the Rohlfing case). In the Rohlfing case the court states the rule
as to when joinder should be allowed correctly, as I think, although I have
some feeling that in both the Rohifing and Kahiz cases the court viewed the
matter too narrowly, and should have regarded the sale of one product to
different retailers in the same metropolitan area as one series of transactions. On this last matter my position is supported by the case note at 65
Harv. L. Rev. 890 (1952), as well as by such cases as Benton v. Deininger,
21 F. 2d 657 (W.D. N.Y. 1927); Brown v. Kinnicutt, 2 F. 2d 263 (S.D.
N.Y. 1924) ; and Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924). The
Kain, case has just been reversed for the reason suggested here, 16 Fed. Rules
Serv. 23a.33, case 4 (7th Cir. 1952).
130. Hynd v. McGraw, 11 F. R. D. 82 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (joinder allowed of claim against four defendants with a second claim against two of
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cases in which joinder would be proper by either test, but in which
the court states that it is allowing joinder because the claims present
a common question of law or fact and arise from the same transaction. And last are the cases which seem to me to be square holdings in favor of the Hincks-Moore point of view,13' cases in which
joinder is not allowed because the Hincks-MIoore test is not met,
although by the test I suggest joinder should have been allowed.
Inevitably, too, there are a couple cases 13 - in which joinder was
denied though it was proper by either test.
them) ; Bowles v. J. E. King Mfg. Co., 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 20a.2, case 1
(W.D. Mo. 1945) (claim against all defendants of conspiring to evade
OPA'regulations properly joined with separate claims of violation against
each individual defendant) ; Joerger v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 276
Pac. 1017 (1929) (claim against both defendants may be joined with claim
against one of them, since the claims arise from the same transaction) ; Hepler v. Wright, 35 Cal. App. 567, 170 Pac. 667 (1917) (A, B, and C may join
as plaintiffs in a suit to enjoin interference with their water rights, where
A and B owned lot 1, and all three owned lot 2) ; Hoyt v. Ruge, 119 Misc.
544, 197 N. Y. Supp. 527 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (joinder of claims for partition
of parcels 1, 2, and 3 allowed, although all defendants interested in parcel 1
and only some in parcels 2 and 3).
Although, as I say in the text, I think these cases have the force of
dicta against me, the dicta does no,: run one way only. Thus in the Joerger
case, where the court allowed the joinder because the claims arose from the
same transaction, it also makes the statement, which I think is correct:
"... if one of the causes of action affects all of the parties, it is no objection that other causes of action affect only some of them, where all the
parties are concerned in the main purpose of the litigation." 207 Cal. at 19,
276 Pac. at 1023.
131. Man-Sew Pinking Attachment Corp. v. Chandler Machine Co., 29
F. Supp. 480 (D. Mass. 1939) (claim against both defendants for patent
infringement may not be joined with a claim against one of them for unfair
competition) ; Murphy v. Patten, 85 Atl. 56 (N.J.L. 1912) (claim against
landlord and other for wrongful distraint may be joined with claim against
landlord for breach of covenant of lease only if plaintiff amends to show
claims arise from the same transaction) ; 137 East 66th Street, Inc. v.
Lawrence, 118 Misc. 486, 194 N. Y. Supp. 762 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (claim
against two tenants for damage to an apartment cannot be joined with a
claim against these two and a third for rent and commissions).
132. In Carl Gutmann & Co., Inc. v. Rohrer Knitting Mills, Inc., 86
F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa. 1949), joinder was not allowed of three claims
against one corporation for breach of contract with a fourth claim against
a second corporation and the persons who were officers and stockholders of
both for conspiring to induce breach of contract, even though the court
specifically notes that both claims arise from the same transaction, and
therefore may be presumed to involve common questions. The court compounded its error by ordering dismissal of the fourth claim for misjoinder, in
flat violation of the dictate of F. R. C. P. 21 (and Minn. R. C. P. 21) :
"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action." The correct
remedy for misjoinder, as the Christianson case shows, is severance.
In Colburn v. Birr, 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 15a.3, case 5 (N.D. Ill. 1945),
criticised 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 319, the court refused to allow joinder of
claims of unfair competition by threats under one patent, in which both defendants were interested, and under a second patent, in which only one defendant was interested. The court did not discuss plaintiff's additional allegation of conspiracy by the defendants, which in such cases as Thomas v.
Moore, note 128 sutpra, and Bowles v. J. E. King Mfg. Co., note 130 supra,

was thought to make the joinder proper by either test.
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On the basis of this analysis of the cases I think it fair to conclude that precedent is on the side of the view expressed in the
Christianson case, but that there is no such weight of precedent
that way to demand that a court which is willing to study the
problem closely need feel bound by the handful of unreasoned
opinions contrary to my view.
I have considered this problem of multiple claims and multiple
parties at such great length for three reasons. First, I think it perhaps the most complicated problem which the new rules on joinder
present. Second, in view of the reputation for scholarship which Judge
Hincks and Professor Moore enjoy, it would be an impertinence
to call their view wrong without presenting a detailed exposition of
why it is wrong. Finally, I began my consideration of permissive
joinder by referring to the long struggles which ensued and the
errors which were made before satisfactory rules on this subject
were devised. There is no more sorry chapter in that story than
the judicial decisions holding that bold new provisions for joinder
of parties were limited by earlier and more restrictive rules on
joinder of causes. 33 It would seem to me particularly tragic if history were to repeat itself and if the unlimited joinder of claims
provided by Rule 18 should be held to be limited by the provisions
for joinder of parties in Rule 20, when such a reading would do
violence not only to the purpose of the rules but also to their
language as I understand it.
IMPLEADER

The broad provisions of Rule 14.01 allowing a defendant to implead a third party "who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim against him" are responsive to a suggestion
from the Minnesota Supreme Court that impleader provisions
would be desirable134 and codify a practice which had been found
immensely useful in England, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin,
and the admiralty courts"" as well as under the Federal Rules and
state systems modelled thereon.
Where the defendant wishes to exercise his privilege to implead
133. Ader v. Blau, 241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771 (1925) ; Grady v. War-

ren, 201 N. C. 693, 161 S. E. 319 (1931) ; Smurthwaite v. Hannay, [1894]
A. C. 494. See Clark on Code Pleading 438-440 (2d ed. 1947) ; Clark and
Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and a

Protest, 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 346, 357-359 (1950).
134. See Kemerer v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239,

245-247, 276 N. W. 228, 231-232 (1937). Although Minn. Stat. §§540.16
and 548.20 (1949) may have allowed impleader, they were not frequently

used for that purpose.
135. 3

'Moore's Federal Practice §§14.20-14.24 (2d ed. 1948).
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a third party meeting the test of the rule, he must make a motion'30
for leave to file a summons and complaint on the third party. In
theory the court has discretion whether to grant the motion' 7 but
where the motion is promptly made 3 s I think that there should be
few, if any, cases in which the court ought to deny the motion. Of
course bringing the third party in may complicate the litigation 3"
but the power to order separate trials of separate issues, granted
by Rule 42.02, should be sufficient safeguard against harm from that
source.1 40 The fact that plaintiff's action may be delayed by the
impleader is hardly a sufficient objection, since the loss of time is
compensated for by the elimination of a possible second action between defendant and the third party on the same transaction.' 41 In
any event it is silly for a judge to purport to exercise his discretion
at the time of the defendant's motion; a much better procedure
would be for him to allow service of the third-party complaint, reserving a final decision on its propriety until the third-party .defendant has answered, or has raised his own objections to being
brought into the suit. At that time the judge will know what issues
really arise between defendant and the third party, and can decide
on that basis, rather than in a vacuum, whether their controversy
might better be fought out in a second suit.
Rule 14.01 is explicit that a third-party complaint may be served
only "upon a person not a party to the action." It is clear from this
that where the person liable over is a co-defendant the correct
procedure is to file a cross-claim, under Rule 13.07, rather than a
third-party claim, 142 and if the claim is against a co-defendant and a
third party, a cross-claim, combined with a motion under 13.OS to
136. Before service of his answer defendant may move ex parte; thereafter the motion must be with notice to the plaintiff. Minn. R. C. P. 14.01.
The form of the motion is set out as Official Form 17, Minn. R. C. P.
137. General Taxicab Ass'n v. O'Shea, 109 F. 2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.05 (2d ed. 1948); Comm., Discretion of
Court on Motion to linplead,2 Fe. Rules Serv. 648 (1940).
138. Of course it is proper for the court to deny the motion out of
hand where it comes late in the case. Spaulding v. Parry Navigation Co.,
Inc., 10 F. R. D. 290 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); Union Nat. Bank v. Superior Steel
Corp., 9 F. R. D. 128 (W.D. Pa. 1949); Bull v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 6 F. R. D. 7 D. Neb. 1946).
139. The reason given for denial of the motion in, e.g., Andromidas v.
Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb. 1950).
140. As it was held to be in Miskell v. W. T. Cown, Inc., 10 F. R. D.
617 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
141. Cf. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandisch-Amerikaansche StoomvaartMaatschappij, 6 F. R. D. 297 (S.I). N.Y. 1946).
142. Almacenes Fernandez, S.A. v. Golodetz, 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a21,
case 1 (S.D. N.Y. 1944). The contrary decision in Shannon v. Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co., 62 F. Supp. 532 (W.D. La. 1945) seems just thati.e., contrary-in ignoring the plain language of the rule. But it hardly makes
any difference in practical effect.
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bring in the third party to answer to the cross-claim, would still
be the appropriate procedure. Similarly where the claim is against
a third party and the original plaintiff, the correct move is to counterclaim under 13.01 or 13.02 and have the third party brought in by
virtue of 13.08.143 In the situations thus far, however, it seems to

me unimportant if defendant mistakenly chooses to file a third-party
complaint rather than following what I think is the proper procedure.
But there is a situation where the provision of the rule now being
considered becomes more serious. Suppose that a driver of a car
and his passenger join in a suit against the other driver for personal
injuries. The defendant wishes to claim that the plaintiff-driver
was negligent, and that defendant has a right to contribution or
indemnity against him for sums defendant may have to pay to the
passenger. By what procedure can defendant raise this claim? Both
Rule 13.07, on cross-claims, and Rule 14.01, on impleader, speak
in terms of "is or may be liable" and thus may be used for a contingent claim to contribution or indemnity. But the former rule
may only be used against a co-party, while the plaintiff-driver here
is an adversary party, and the latter rule can only be used against
persons not already party to the action. There is nothing in 13.02,
the permissive counterclaim rule, which prevents defendant from
filing his claim against plaintiff-driver by this means, but it seems
to be thought that since this rule does not specifically authorize
the pleading of contingent claims, it may not be used. 44 The answer
which has been worked out by the courts which have considered
the problem is to use the broad power of severance given by the
final sentence of Rule 21, and to sever the claim of the passenger
from the claim of the plaintiff-driver. 145 Then, since the latter is
no longer a party to the passenger's claim, he meets the test of Rule
14.01 and may be impleaded. To add a final fillip, the leading
opinion on all this suggests that after the severance and impleader
has taken place, it will be permissible to consolidate the two actions
again for purposes of trial,140 so that the advantage of clearing up
143. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.14 (2d ed. 1948). In Dewey &
Almy Chemical Co. v. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 1021
(E.D. N.Y. 1939), defendant was allowed to file a third-party complaint
against the third party and the original plaintiff. A famous comment of
Judge Learned Hand-regrettably not printable in this family magazinewould describe my feelings about this decision.
144. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.14 (2d ed. 1948).
145. Sporia v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 143 F. 2d 105 (3d Cir. 1944);
Jacobson v. Shober, 7 F. R. D. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ; Chevassus v. Harley,
8 F. R. D. 410 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
146 Sporia v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 143 F. 2d 105, 108 (3d Cir.
1944).
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related matters in one suit won't be lost. I suppose all this legerdemain is fine if you have a taste for that sort of thing; had I been
the judge I would have taken the bull by the horns and allowed
the impleader originally without getting too worried about the
7
literal language of Rule 14.01.
The use of impleader to present contingent claims is best illustrated by the well-known decision of Judge Nordbye in Jeub v.
B/G Foods, Inc.148 Plaintiff sued a restaurant, claiming that he
had been served unwholesome and deleterious food, in violation of
the Minnesota statutes, and had been damaged thereby. Defendant
filed a third-party complaint against Swift & Co., claiming that he
had obtained the food from that company in a sealed can, that if it
was unwholesome it was Swift's fault, and demanding on commonlaw principles that Swift indemnify him for any sums he might have
to pay plaintiff. Swift moved to vacate the third-party complaint,
arguing that under Minnesota law no right to indemnity would
exist unless and until the restaurant had to pay a judgment to the
plaintiff. But Judge Nordbye held that the purpose of the impleader
rule is to accelerate the determination of liability, and to avoid circuity of action.
"The fact that an independent action for money recovery
could not be brought at this. time does not militate against B/G
Foods' right to invoke a procedure which will determine rights
of the parties concurrently with that of the basic proceeding, and
if and when any loss has been sustained as to which Swift and
Company is liable over, the laws of this State in regard thereto
may be made effective .... Rule 14 is not restricted to the rights
of indemnity or contribution which are presently enforceable ....
Judge Nordbye went on to point out how the judgment could be
shaped to preserve the substantive rights of the parties, by providing that the judgment for indemnity could be stayed until the
judgment in favor of the original plaintiff had been paid. And the
Minnesota Supreme Court has already indicated that Rule 14.01
147. I suggest this bold course on the ground that there is nothing a
complaining party could do about it. An order allowing impleader is neither
appealable nor subject to review by writ of certiorari. Chapman v. Dorsey,
230 Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 2d 438 (1950). And since the same end result can
be reached by the mumbo-jumbo of severance, impleader, and consolidation,
the point would surely be "harmless error," within the meaning of Minn.
R. C. P. 61, if the complaining party sought to raise it in his appeal after final
judgment. Besides I should hope that the Bar of Minnesota is more considerate of the time of its busy judges than to require them to enact the
little morality play which the literal language of 14.01 seems to demand.

148. 2 F. R. D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942).
149.

Id. at 240. See 3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.08 (2d ed. 1948).
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may be used for the same purpose in the state practice as it was in
the Jeub case. 5 0
As soon as the notion of using Rule 14.01 to accelerate the determination of rights has been grasped, the question of impleader
of a liability insurer comes immediately to mind. If the "is or may
be liable" clause in Rule 14.01 allows impleader of a joint tortfeasor for contribution, even though absent the rule he could not
be sued until after the original defendant had paid a judgment,
doesn't it also mean that an insurer can be brought in, although the
"no action" clause of the the usual insurance policy prohibits suit
against the company until the insured has paid a judgment? Of
course it does. I should say that this is so clear that not only
may a court in its discretion allow such impleader, but that it would
be a gross abuse of discretion to deny the impleader.
Of course this whole question is of more theoretical interest than
practical importance, for there is only a very limited situation in
which such impleader would be attempted. In the usual tort case the
insurance company will conduct the defense. It is hardly likely that
it will seek to implead itself. And even if the defendant is aware
of the possibilities Rule 14.01 offers, an attempt on his part to
implead the insurer when the insurer is already defending for him
would undoubtedly be a breach of the policy clause requiring the
insured to "cooperate" in the defense.15' Thus we are limited to the
case in which the insurer has disclaimed liability and refused to
conduct the defense. There the "no action" clause can be no bar,
because the express purpose of 14.01 is to accelerate the determination of liability.15 2 And an experienced Federal judge has found still
further grounds for refusing to allow the "no action" clause to bar
impleader:
150. Gustafson v. Johnson, 51 N. W. 2d 108, 113-116 (Minn. 1952),
36 Minn. L. Rev. 543.
151. See the interesting discussion at Proceedings of Cleveland Institute on Federal Rules 250-254 (A.B.A., 1938).
152. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.12 (2d ed. 1948) ; Comm., Inpleading of Insirer as Third-Party Defendant, 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 650, 651
(1940). This is why the New York cases denying impleader of the insurer are
not apposite, for the New York impleader statute reads "is or will be liable"
and the court rested its decision on a refusal to read this as equivalent to
"is or may be liable." Kromback v. Killian, 215 App. Div. 19, 213 N. Y. Supp.
138 (2d Dep't 1925). Since the recent change in language of the New York
statute, impleader of the insurer has uniformly been allowed. E.g., Brooklyn
Yarn Dye Co. v. Empire State Warehouses Corp., 276 App. Div. 611, 96
N. Y. S. 2d 738 (2d Dep't 1950); Adelman Mfg. Corp. v. New York Wood
Finisher's Supply Co., 277 App. Div. 1117, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 867 (2d Dep't
1950) ; Lecouna Cuban Boys, Inc. v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 276 App. Div.
808, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 113 (3d Dep't 1949). See Bisselle, Impleader of Casualty
Insurance Companies in New York State, 18 Ins. Counsel J. 37 (1951).
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"The 'no-action' clause is directly opposed to Rule 14. It
poses a question as to whether the court should permit litigants
to circumvent rules of court by contractual arrangements. Rule
14 was promulgated not only for the purpose of serving litigants
but as a wise exposition of public policy. The object of the rule
was to facilitate litigation, to save costs, to bring all of the
litigants into one proceeding, and to dispose of an entire matter
without the expense and the labor of many suits and many trials.
The no-action provision of the policy is neither helpful to the
third-party defendant, to the courts, nor generally is it in the
interest of the public welfare. Its object is to put weights on the
already too slow feet of justice. Moreover, such provision, if
permitted to become effective, should not operate in this case
for the reason that the third-party defendant is alleged to have
breached its contract. According to the third-party complaint, it
has declined to perform the obligation of its undertaking in any
way. It has refused to defend the defendants or third-party plaintiffs and has declined to meet the expenses contemplated by its
contract. Under such circumstances it should not be permitted to
interpose contractual provisions of a contract it has repudiated." 53
So far as I can discover, every case which has been decided
under an impleader rule identical with our Rule 14.01 has allowed
impleader of insurers in these circumstances.'"
It seems to be supposed that where impleader of the insurer is
allowed that the court must forthwith order separate trials, under
153. Reeves, D. J., in Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F. R. D. 140, 142 (W.D.
Mo. 1945).
154. Jordan v. Stephens, note 153 supra; A B & C Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v. Moger, 10 F. R. D. 613 (E.D. N.Y. 1950); Petersen v.
Falzarano, 6 N. J. 447, 79 A. 2d 50 (1951) ; and cases cited note 152 supra;
see Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D. Md. 1939); Crawford,
Third-PartyPractcie Under the Missouri Code, 19 U. of Kan. City L. Rev. 16,
33-34 (1951); 36 Minn. L. Rev. 421, 422 n. 3 (1952); 49 Col. L. Rev. 861
(1949). In King v. Shepherd, 26 F. Supp. 357 (W.D. Ark. 1938), the thirdparty complaint against the insurer was dismissed for improper venue. In
Moreland v. Pennsylvania R. Co., .3 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.221, case 1 (S.D.
Ohio 1945), defendant railroad company was not allowed to implead the insurer of the owner of the car in which plaintiff was driving at the time of
the injury; but since the owner was not a party, and there was no theory on
which her insurer would be liable, no other result could have been expected.
The cases of Pucheu v. National Surety Corp., 87 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. La.
1949) (impleader allowed) and Combs v. Continental Casualty Co., 54 F.
Supp. 507 (N.D. Ala. 1944) (impleader denied) are cases in which the
insurer is the main defendant and seeks to implead other insurers for contribution. They turn on whether te state in which they arise recognizes a
right to contribution, and have nothing to do with our problem.
For the reasons stated in the text, I think that the dicta suggesting that
there should be a different result in personal injury cases than in other insurance cases-see DeLong v. Allen, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 635, 637 (Sup. Ct.
1951); J. A. Ewing & McDonald, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 193
Misc. 173, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 559 (City Ct. N.Y. 1948)-are quite indefensible.
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Rule 42.02, in order to avoid prejudice.1 5 I think that this proposition deserves more critical thought than it seems to have had thus
far. Who will be prejudiced? Surely not the plaintiff-one gathers
that a plaintiffs' lawyer's idea of the hereafter is a lawsuit in which
the jury knows defendant is insured. Surely not the defendant-if
he had any fear of prejudice he would hardly invite the insurance
company to become a third-party defendant. And the company
won't be prejudiced on the substantial issue of liability vel non;
under the older procedure by which defendant, after paying the
judgment, sued the company to collect from it, the jury was well
aware in considering the question of liability that the insurer was
involved. The only conceivable prejudice which might arise is that
the jury, having decided that the insurance company was liable,
might award a larger sum in damages to the plaintiff. Even if this
bogeyman is not, as I think, entirely unrealistic 5 6 it can arise only
where both issues are to be tried to the jury; if defendant waives
his right to a jury on the issue of the company's liability the jury
will have no means of knowing whether the verdict it finds is to be
paid by the defendant or by the company. I suggest that this is an
improvement over the present situation where juries take it for
granted that the damages they award will come out of the deep
pocket of some liability insurer.
At the short course on the new rules offered by the University
of Minnesota Law School last December the following question
was posed to me: if the insurer because of bad faith or negligence
rejects an offer of settlement within the policy limits and the insured
is subsequently sued for an amount greater than his insurance coverage, may he implead the insurer on his claim of injury by the in155. DeLany v. Allen, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 635 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Petersen

v. Falzarano, note 154 supra; see Tullgren v. Jasper, loc. cit. note 154 supra;

Proceedings of Cleveland Institute on Federal Rules 253 (A.B.A. 1938) ; see
36 Minn. L. Rev. 421 (1952). Everyone concedes that no prejudice is possible
if the case is tried to the court. E.g., Koolery v. Lindemann, 91 N. Y. S. 2d
505 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Remch v. Grabow, 193 Misc. 731, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 462
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
156. "The argument in the reply brief that to import the insurance com-

pany. into the case may react unfavorably . . . before a jury, is less than

convincing. In this day and generation there may possibly remain a vestige
of ingenuousness in the minds of jurors concerning insurance coverage of
the operators of most motor vehicles, but I venture to doubt it. The current
facts of life, concerning the ultimate financial responsibility involved, are
pretty generally known by personal experience or the reading of newspaper
and magazine advertising, on the part of those of sufficient intelligence to
qualify as jurors in this court. Indeed, the size of verdicts may not be unrelated to that awareness." A B & C Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v.
,Moger, 10 F. R. D. 613, 615 (E.D. N.Y. 1950). See Tullgren v. Jasper, loc.
cit. note 154 supra.
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surer's refusal to settle?157 Despite indications at the time from
Judge Charles E. Clark that I was wrong, I argued that impleader
would not be permissible under such circumstances. I have now
decided that I must recant. On mature consideration it seems to me
that the rule allows such impleader, that the company is a person
who "is or may be liable" to defendant for all or part of plaintiff's
claim against defendant, and that a third-party complaint which
alleged that the insurer negligently-or in bad faith-refused the
settlement offer and had damaged defendant to the extent of any
judgment which plaintiff may get in excess of the policy limits
states a "claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" sufficient against a motion to dismiss. But what is to be gained by
such impleader? Separate trials on the original complaint and the
third-party complaint would have to be ordered as a matter of
course; not only would the refused settlement offer be inadmissible
before the jury which was considering plaintiff's claim, x s but
since the proof of the pudding is in the eating, it would be impossible
to tell whether the company's refusal to settle was wise or unwise until plaintiff's claim had been litigated. And although I am not advised
in the premises, I should think that there might at least be question
whether the duty of the insured to cooperate with the insurer would
allow him to fine such a third-party complaint. I suspect that it is
for practical reasons of this sort that there is, so far as I can find,
no reported case in which a defendant has tried to implead his
insurer for this purpose.
Another neat problem which impleader presents is whether a
defendant may implead a third party liable over to him for plaintiff's claim when the plaintiff is under some disability which would
bar him from suing the third party directly. Now it has been
held that a defendant may implead plaintiff's employer, even
though plaintiff could not himself sue the employer because his
sole remedy is under a compensation act. 59 The third party may be
impleaded although the statute of limitations would bar a suit against
157. The duty of the insurer in these circumstances is discussed at 34
Minn. L. Rev. 150 (1950).
158. Wigmore's Code of Evidence §997 (3d ed. 1942).
159. Corrao v. Waterman S. S. Co., 75 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. N.Y. 1948)
Severn v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 21 (S.D. N.Y. 1946); Murray v.
Lavinsky, 120 Pa. Super. 392, 182 Ati. 803 (1936); and cases cited at 3

Moore's Federal Practice §14.10 n. 24 (2d ed. 1948). But cf. Liberty Mutual

Ins. Co. v. Vallendingham, 94 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1950). See 36 Minn. L.
Rev. 549 (1952).

1952]
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him directly by plaintiff. '1o And probably a covenant by plaintiff
not to sue the third party will be ineffective against impleader of
the third party.,"
The situation in which controversy arises is where the third
party defendant sought to be brought in is the husband or wife
of the original plaintiff. Most of the cases involving this situation
are cases in which the attempted impleader was to get contribution;
an immediate distinction in terms of the substantive right to contribution recognized in the particular state must be made in analyzing these seemingly-procedural cases. In some states a joint
judgment is necessary as a basis for contribution; if plaintiff chooses
not to sue all the tortfeasors, the ones that he does sue are stuck,
and cannot have contribution from their more fortunate fellows.
In states which follow this rule defendant can never implead a
joint tortfeasor to seek contribution, even whe, e there is no such
special disability as the husband-wife relatioi >:Volv,.A Thus it
should hardly surprise us that these states refuse to allow defent6
dant to implead plaintiff's spouse for purposes of cGntrilbuion. 2
But in other states all that is necessary for contribution i a common
liability, and the tortfeasor who is sued can implead his fellows
to have his right to contribution litigated concurrently with the
main action. In states where there is no bar on suit between
spouses, and which allow impleader for contribution, the spouse
of course can be brought in for this purpose. 163 Thus trouble can
come only in a state which meets three requirements: suit between
husband and wife is not allowed; the right to contribution turns
on a common liability rather than a joint judgment; and the procedural rules provide for broad impleader. In two of the three
jurisdictions which meet these requirements and had passed on
the question, defendant has been allowed to implead plaintiff's
spouse for contribution, even though plaintiff could not have joined
the spouse originally as a defendant. 64 But a recent case from an
160. Adam v. Vacquier, 48 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Pa. 1942) ; Godfrey v.
Tidewater Power Co., 223 N. C. 647, 27 S. E. 2d 736 (1943); Battle v.
Laurel Line Taxicab Co., 52 Pa. D. & C. 534 (1945).
161. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.10 (2d ed. 1948) ; see Buttorff v.
Sun Oil Co., 2 F. R. D. 508, 509 (M.D. Pa. 1942); Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act §5, in 9 U. L. A.
162. Schroeder v. Longenecker, 7 F. R. D. 9 (E.D. Mo. 1947), 17 U. of
Cin. L. Rev. 93 (1948) ; Ackerson v. Kibler, 138 Misc. 695, 246 N. Y. Supp.
580 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 306, 249 N. Y. Supp. 629 (4th
Dep't 1931).

163. E.g., Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475, 210 N. W. 822

(1926).

164. Gray v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. La.
1940) ; Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A. 2d 912 (1945). Contra:
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important court has rejected this result, saying that where the
spouse cannot be sued directly he or she is not liable and, therefore,
that common liability necessary for contribution is not present. 165
It is difficult to predict how Minnesota will go on this question,
which seems certain to be litigated in this state. Rule 14.01 is the
most modern sort of impleader rule, and will be usable in this
state to get contribution from tortfeasors, even though they were
not originally joined by plaintiff. 166 On the other hand we follow
the usual rule prohibiting tort actions between spouses,'1 7 and since
we put much emphasis on a "common liability" as the basis for
contribution, 168 our court might well hold that no contribution
can be had from plaintiff's spouse. But this conclusion is not
inevitable. Our court has quoted with approval language indicating
that the prohibition on suits between spouses is merely the denial
of a remedy, and that, in Cardozo's phrase, "unlawful the act
remains, however shorn of a remedy."'-6 9 On a verbal level I concede
that a "liability" from which one is immune sounds suspiciously
like a contradiction in terms, but the desirability of allowing contribution is so clear on grounds of policy' 70 that it can be hoped the
court will overlook the verbal incongruity involved. Some support
for this hope may be found in the fact that our Court in a different
situation has allowed an action against the husband where the
proceeds will be for the sole benefit of the wife so long as formally
7
it is not directly a suit between the two.' '
Where defendant seeks to implead the spouse for some purpose
other than contribution I think it clear that Minnesota will allow the impleader. Along these lines Minnesota has allowed
a wife to sue her husband's principal for damages suffered by her at
Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S. E.* 841 (1934)
(original plaintiff unemancipated minor child of third party).
165. Yellow Cab Co. of D. C. v. Dreslin, 181 F. 2d 626 (D.C. Cir.
1950). The annotation to this case at 19 A. L. R. 2d 1003 (1951) is undiscriminating in its failure to make the kind of distinctions as to type of impleader rule and nature of the contribution right suggested in my text.
166. Gustafson v. Johnson, 51 N. W. 2d 108, 113-116 (Minn. 1952).
167. Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N. WV.1022 (1922), and

cases there cited.

168. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 127, 5
N. W. 2d 397, 400 (1942), quoted with approval Bunge v. Yager, 52 N. W.
2d 446, 540 (Minn. Sup. Ct., Marzh 21, 1952).
169. Miller v. J.A. Tyrholn & Co., Inc., 196 Minn. 438, 442-443, 265
N. W. 324, 326-327 (1936), quoting Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249

N. Y. 253, 257, 164 N. E. 42, 43 (1928), and McLaurin v. McLaurin Furni-

ture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 190-191, 146 So. 877, 879 (1933).
170. 17 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 93- 96-97 (1948) ; Note, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 634,

654-658 (1949).
171.

Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N. W. 377 (1934).
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the hands of her husband while acting within the scope of his agency,
and this even though the principal, being only secondarily liable,
will have an action over against the husband. 2 Where, as there,
the substantive right is clear, there can be no question but that
Rule 14 may be used to avoid circuity of action in enforcing the
substantive rights.
Rule 14.01 is quite clear that once the third party has been
impleaded, he may assert any defenses he may have against the
plaintiff in the main action, 73 and the plaintiff and the third party
may assert against each other any claims which they may have
arising out of the transaction or occurrence involved in the main
action, although they are not required to do so.'4 The usual rules
as to compulsory and permissive counterclaims apply, not only to
the claim which the original defendant makes against the third party,
but also as to any claims which the plaintiff and the third party may
have asserted against each other. 5 Thus suppose that the plaintiff
and the third party have claims against each other arising out of
the transaction or occurrence involved in the main action, but that
one or both wish, as a matter of strategy, to save these claims for
a later suit. As long as both follow this course all is well, since there
isno compulsion on them to assert claims against each other. But
as soon as one does assert his claims the other must present his as
a compulsory counterclaim thereto, as he will be barred from any
later action.
INTERPLEADER

Not much need be said about interpleader, for while Rule 22
makes important advances over the prior Minnesota practice, they
are of a sort that are easily described and understood. Interpleader
comes to us originally from equity, and the chancellors regarded
four conditions as essential to its maintenance: (1) the same thing,
debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all of the parties against
whom the relief is demanded; (2) all their adverse titles or claims
must be dependent, or be derived from a common source-this is
the well known requirement of "privity"; (3) the person asking the
relief must not have or claim any interest in the subject matter; and
(4) he must have incurred no independent liability to either of the
172. Miller v. J.A. Tyrholm & Co., Inc., 196 Minn. 438, 265 N. W.
324 (1936), approved 20 Minn. L. Rev. 566.
173. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.13 (2d ed. 1948).
174. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.16 (2d ed. 1948).
175. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §14.17 (2d ed. 1948).
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claimants, but must be an indifferent stakeholder.17 So far as one
can tell, these same limitations were applied in actions under the
Minnesota statutes'177 which provided relief in the nature of inter78
pleader.1
All four of the old limitations on interpleader are abolished by
the explicit language of the next to last sentence of Rule 22. The
stakeholder need not be indifferent, but may vigorously contest his
liability to one or both parties, the claimants need not be in privity
with each other, and they need not be claiming the same "thing,
debt, or duty.' 7 9 It now should be possible to use the interpleader
device in any case in which a party fears that he may be vexed by
multiple litigation.
A recent Federal case 80 presents a nice example of the kind of
complicated situation which can be readily unraveled by interpleader, and of the procedure to be used. The named beneficiary
176.

Clark on Code Pleading 428 (2d ed. 1947); 4 Pomeroy, Equity

Jurisprudence §1322 (5th ed. 1941).

177. Minn. Stat. §§544.12, 544.[4 (1949).
178. Austin v. March, 86 Minn. 232, 90 N. W. 384 (1902); State
ex rel Northwestern Nat. Bank v. District Court, 192 Minn. 602, 258 N. W.
7 (1934) ; cf. Alton & Peters v. Merritt, 145 Minn. 426, 177 N. AV. 770
(1926). See 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §§1935-1940.
179. Only as to the last mentioned contention has controversy arisen.
In John A. Moore & Co., Inc. v. McConkey, 240 Mo. App. 198, 203 S. W. 2d
512 (1947), the court said that the Missouri statute-identical so far as is
here relevant with Minn. R. C. P. 22-had abolished the second of the onceessential conditions for interpleader, and had liberalized the remedy with
regard to the third and fourth conditions; but it made no mention of that
statute having any effect on the first condition, that "the same thing, debt,
or duty must be claimed" by all the claimants. And there is support in the
Federal cases for the view that the 5irst condition remains as before: United
States for use of Eaton v. Olson, 5 F. R. D. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1946) ; Buxton
v. Acadian Production Corp., 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 22.12, case 1 (W.D.
La. 1940) ; Standard Surety & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 956 (W.D.
1939), rev'd on other grounds, 105 F. 2d 578 (8th Cir. 1939). This view
turns, however, on what I think is an unnecessary and unwise restriction of
the language of Rule 22, where it r.equires merely the possibility that plaintiff "may be exposed to multiple liability" and says the claims need not be
"identical." In Girard Trust Co. v. Vance, 4 F. R. D. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1945),
three different brokers claimed to have found the buyer for a block of stock,
and to be entitled to the commission on its sale. When plaintiff sought to
make them interplead, they urged that as each had had a separate contract providing for a commission if it found a buyer, they were not claiming
on the same debt and that interpleader would not lie. The court overruled
the objection, and allowed the interpleader. I should think this quite sound
in view of the language of the rule, and in refreshing contrast to the opposite Minnesota decision on almost identical facts. Alton & Peters v. Merritt,
145 Minn. 426, 177 N. W. 770 (1920). My view on this matter-that the first
of the "essential conditions" for interpleader is abolished by the rule-is
shared by the outstanding authorities respectively on interpleader and on
the rules. Chafee, Federal Interpleader since the Act of 1936, 49 Yale L. J.
377, 408 (1940) ; 3 Moore's Federal Practice §22.04(1) (2d ed. 1948).
180. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yarrow, 95 F. Supp. 185
(E.D. Pa. 1951).
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under a $30,000 life insurance policy claimed the proceeds, which,
after deducting policy loans, amounted to about $21,000. Another
person claimed to be the legal owner of the policy, and, arguing
that the policy loans were improper, demanded the full face amount
of the policy. The insurer admitted its liability of $21,000 but
denied being liable for the excess, and it was indifferent as to
which of the claimants got the $21,000. Further, there was a right
to a jury trial as to whether the policy loans were proper, but no
such right on the question of which claimant should have the proceeds. The company brought an action of interpleader. The court
ordered the company to deposit the full amount of the policy,
$30,000, in court, and then allowed it to stand aloof while the
claimants contested between themselves, in a trial to the court, their
right'to the proceeds. If the named beneficiary was successful at
this stage, the balance of $9,000 would be returned to the insurer,
and the action would be at an end. But if the other claimant was
successful in the first stage he would forthwith be paid $21,000,
and then a jury could be impanelled to determine his right to the
other $9,000.
Interpleader under Rule 22 is not restricted to plaintiffs. Where
a person has been sued already, and fears that others may later
present claims against him in the same matter, he may require the
plaintiff and the other claimants to interplead, by filing a counterclaim for interpleader. But this is not all, for the rule also preserves
the former Minnesota practice'"" by which if the defendant admits
liability and deposits the amount claimed in court, he may be discharged from the action and have the potential adverse claimants
substituted as defendants in his stead. Of course where the stakeholder wishes to dispute his liability in whole or part, or where the
amount of his liability may differ according to which claimant is
successful, this procedure is not open to him, and he must counterclaim for interpleader.
In essence Rule 22 furnishes a useful corrolary to Rule 20.01,
which allows joinder of parties in the alternative. The latter rule
permits joinder of defendants where it is uncertain which of them is
liable, and allows plaintiffs to join where they are not sure which
of them has the right to prevail. Interpleader makes available the
same free joinder to the person against whom the claim might
otherwise be pressed.
181. Mfinn. Stat. §544.12 (1949).
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CLASS AcTIoNs

The class action device has never been of much importance in
Minnesota, although, in common with the other Code states, there
was provision in the statutes for one or more persons to sue or
defend in behalf of an entire class where the question was of common interest to many parties, and there were so many persons who
might be made parties that it would be impracticable to bring them
all into court. 18 2 But Rule 23.01 is broader in scope and more helpfully drafted than the old statute, and its adoption may presage
much more frequent use of the class action in Minnesota, as was the
case in the Federal system when the similar rule was adopted
there."8 3
Rule 23.01 sets out two basic requirements for a class action:
the members of the class must be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all into court, 84 and the persons who are
suing or being sued on behalf of all must be such as to assure adequate representation to the entire class. 8 5 The rule then goes on
to set out three situations in which, the basic requirements being
met, a class action is permissible. These three situations, which are
distinguished from each other in practical effect largely by the
different rules of res judicata applicable, are popularly known as
the "true", the "hybrid", and the "spurious" class suit. 8 0
-The true class action is one in which, but for the class action
device, joinder of all interested persons would be required, 8 7 and
thus it is that subsection 1 of Rule 23.01, which describes the true
class suit, speaks in language reminiscent of Rule 19.01, the compulsory joinder of parties rule. The two kinds of class suits which
have been most common in Minnesota, the stockholders' suit to
182. Minn. Stat. §540.02 (1949). The statute phrased the requirements
of a common interest and of numerous parties in the alternative, but our

court always read the statute as if both elements were required. Advisory
Comm. Note 5 to Rule 23.01.
183. This phenomenon is amusingly described by Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 199-200 (1950), concluding with the lament: "The situation
is so tangled and bewildering that I sometimes wonder whether the world
would be any the worse off if the class-suit device had been left buried in
the learned obscurity of Calvert on Parties to Siits i Equity."
184. See 3 Moore's Federal Practice §23.05 (2d ed. 1948).
185. See 3 Moore's Federal Practice §23.07 (2d ed. 1948).
186. "It may be admitted that the terminology shocks the aesthetic
sense and the succession of adjectives before the noun shows the poverty
of imagination in choice of terms characteristic of the legal profession. But
back of the unedifying nomenclature there is substance." Goodrich, C. J., in
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F. 2d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945).
187. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §23.08 (2d ed. 1948).
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enforce a corporate right and the taxpayers' suit,188 are both true
class suits within the purview of the new rule.
The hybrid class action is one in which the rights of the members of the class are several, and there would be no necessity for
joining all of them, but in which there is also involved property
which may be affected by the claims.' 89
Finally there is the spurious class suit, in which the rights of
the members of the class are several, and they are joined only because of a common question of law or fact affecting their rights,
and a common relief which is sought. 10 The spurious class suit is
really only another permissive joinder device, and one which is
principally useful for avoiding the restrictive jurisdictional requirements of the Federal courts. Indeed serious question has been
raised as to whether it is necessary for a state system to include
the spurious class suit within its rules. 9 ' In any case in which a
spurious class suit would be possible in Minnesota, the members
of the class could also be joined by virtue of Rule 20.01, and it is
92
hard to see what advantage the class action offers.
The effect of a judgment in each of these kinds of class suits
can be simply stated: the judgment in a true class suit is conclusive on all members of the class, whether or not they took part in
the litigation; the judgment in a hybrid class suit is conclusive as
to disposition of the property on all members of the class, but on
other issues is binding only on those persons who entered into the
litigation; and the judgment in a spurious class suit binds only
those actually parties to the proceeding. Of course due process of
law requires that the absent class members be adequately repre188. 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §1858.
189. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §23.09 (2d ed. 1948).
190. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §23.10 (2d ed. 1948).
191. Judge Clark has called it "unnecessary under state procedures,"
California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., 162 F. 2d 893, 897
(2d Cir. 1947), and the Minnesota Judicial Council had proposed that subsection 3 of Rule 23.01, which embodies the spurious class suit, be omitted.
See Advisory Comm. Note I to Rule 23.01. Professor Moore says "there
may be some utility in the spurious class suit even when there are no jurisdictional difficulties," 3 Moore's Federal Practice §23.10(1) (2d ed. 1948),
hut he gives no example, and he criticises-for reasons with which I agreethe one case which purports to set out advantages from such use of the
spurious class suit. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F. 2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941),
criticised 3 Moore's Federal Practice §23.10(1) n. 10 (2d ed. 1948).
192. This would be my answer to the suggestion at Advisory Comm.
Note 8(3) to Rule 23.01 that the spurious class action might be used in
such a situation as that presented in Thorn v. George A. Hormel & Co., 206
Minn. 589, 289 N. W. 516 (1940). In that case the claim of each member
of the class was so small that individual actions would have been impracticable. But now all of those claimants could join as plaintiffs, and the only
added cost which a class action would avoid is the inclusion of the names of
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sented if they are to be bound in any of these situations.10 3 All this,
as I noted, is simply stated. Its application, however, has caused
confusion'" and its wisdom has aroused scholarly debate. To attempt to resolve that confusion, or to weigh the merits of the
opposing arguments, would require a lengthy article of its own.
Perhaps someday I shall write such an article, but for now I must
be content with referring readers to the principal spokesmen of
each camp."'
Rule 23.02 provides that in a stockholders' suit plaintiff must
set out with great particularity his efforts to get the corporation
to take the action he desires, and the reasons why his efforts were
unsuccessful. The substantive principle involved, that the stockholder must try to make the corporation act before bringing suit,
has always been the law in Minnesota19 6 The requirement of "particularity" in the complaint must be observed with care, for in the
Federal courts the similar rule has been interpreted with a strictness that has bordered on harshness. 9 7 The Minnesota rule omits
the requirement of its Federal counterpart that the plaintiff must
aver that he was a stockholder at the time of the transaction of
all of the members of the class in the caption of the complaint.
The holding in the Thorn case that a class suit can only be used in actions
"equitable" in nature-of very dubious soundness even under the Codeis surely not the law under the new rules. See Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young
& Co., 144 F. 2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944); Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Sait, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684, 685 (1941).
193. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 (1940). Compare the inadequate
and near-fraudulent representation which was held to meet the requirements
of due process in the horrendous case of Richardson v. Kelly, 144 Tex. 497,
191 S. W. 2d 857 (1945), cert. devied, 329 U. S. 798 (1947). See Chafee,
Some Problems of Equity 232-242 (1950) ; Note, 55 Yale L. J. 831 (1946).
194. Thus see Lambert, Book Review, 32 B. U. L. Rev. 135, 139-140
(1952): "The reviewer suspects that originally the framers of Rule 23, his
friend, the learned author of the leading work on Federal Practice, Professor
J. W. Moore, and the Almighty understood the province of the true, hybrid
and spurious class suits respectively and their binding effect on outsiders.
With all respect I believe that now only 'J.W.' knows."
195. The case for the rule is made, and its possible complexities illuminated, at 3 Moore's Federal Practice §§23.02-23.12 (2d ed. 1948). The case
against the rule is presented by Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 243-295
(1950), and his discussion of the background of the class suit device, id. at
198-242, is also helpful, although there is little at the latter place with which
I think Moore would disagree. These two works provide ample references
to other literature on the problem. The notes of the Minnesota Advisory
Committee to Rule 23.01, and their counterparts in the official edition of the
Rules, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure in the District Courts 186-187
(1952) are mere paraphrases of Moore-although in the latter case there is
not even the grace to cite to his treatise-but I doubt very much whether they
represent any judgment by the Committee on the kind of issues mooted
between Moore and his critics.

196. See Burns v. Essling, 154 Minn. 304, 306, 191 N.V. 899. 900

(1923).
197. 3 Moore's Federal Practice §23.19 (2d ed. 1948).
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which he complains; no explanation for this deletion has been
made."'
Rule ?3.03 prohibits dismissal or settlement of a class suit without permission of the court, and requires that notice of the proposed dismissal must be given to all members of the class in a true
class action, and that this may be required by the court in hybrid
or spurious class suits.
INTERVENTION

Thus far all of the joinder devices which I have considered have
been means by which persons in a law suit, or about to start one,
can bring in, practically without limitation, other persons or claims.
Rule 24, which provides for intervention, does the opposite job.
It lets the person who has been left out of the suit come into it,
even though his presence may not be wanted by those already there.
In doing this it outlines the circumstances in which the outsider
has an absolute right to come in, and also other circumstances in
which it is left up to the judge to decide whether the third party's
presence will be desirable.
Rule 24.01 authorizes intervention as of right "when the applicant has such an interest in the matter in litigation that he may
either gain or lose by the direct legal effect of the judgment therein whether or not he were a party to the action." The great bulk
of this phrase is taken from the former Minnesota intervention
statute"' and presumably will allow intervention under the same
circumstances as heretofore.200 Thus the principal debtor will be
allowed to intervene in an action against his surety, 201 a third
202
party claiming the goods may intervene in an action of replevin,
a principal may intervene in a suit against his agent on a contract
with the agent,203 and a mortgagee may intervene in a suit by his
198. The Advisory Committee merely says that Rule 23.02 is "substantially the same" as the equivalent Federal rule. Advisory Comm. Note 1
to Rule 23.02. Worse yet, the Revisor of Statutes, not noticing that there
is this important change in language between the Minnesota and the Federal
rule, annotates Minn. R. C. P. 23.02 with four Federal cases cited for the
proposition that: "A petitioner must have been a stockholder at the time of
the transaction of which he complains in order to bring a derivative action
or his shares must have devolved on him by operation of law." Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 195 (1952).
199. Minn. Stat. §544.13 (1949).
200. 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §§1916-1925 is very helpful in its discussion of
the prior law.
201. Becker v. Northway, 44 Minn. 61, 46 N. W. 210 (1890).
202. Brannan v. Wall, 210 Minn. 548, 299 N. W. 243 (1941).
203. Otis Elevator Co. v. Standard Construction Co., 10 F. R. D. 404
(D. Minn. 1950).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
36:580

mortgagor for the destruction of property securing the mortgage
204
debt.
All, then, would be well, and life could go on as before, were it
not for the final words tacked on to the rule, "whetheror not he
were a party to the action." These words were added at a late
date 20 . in order, as the Advisory Committee tells us, to express the
rule of Faricy v. St. Paid Investment & Savings Society.200 That
rather confusing case needs some consideration. Plaintiff was suing
defendant for a money judgment on bonds of defendant which he
held. A third party claimed that he was the true owner of the
bonds, that the plaintiff had obtained them by fraud, and that he
should be allowed to intervene and have judgment on the bonds.
Defendant didn't want the intervenor to be allowed in the law suit,
and argued that since the judgment in the action between plaintiff
and defendant would not bind the intervenor in any way that there
was not the necessary gain or loss "by the direct legal effect of the
judgment" which the statute then, and the rule now, makes a
condition of intervention. The court managed to muddy the waters
right from the start by saying:
"The immediate question is whether that provision of the
statute is to be interpreted as meaning that such person may
gain or lose by the direct legal effect of the judgment (1) by
becoming a party to the action or (2) without becoming a party
to the action. If the former construction be20' adopted,
defendant
-7
must prevail; if the latter, the intervenor.
Here the court has things just reversed. It is the defendant who
is arguing for the latter contention, that a third party must be
affected by the judgment though he is not a party to it before he
may intervene, and the intervenor who is taking the position that
it is enough that he will gain or lose if he is a party to the judgment.
The court got itself straightened out, though it didn't correct
its unfortunate earlier language, when it allowed the intervention,
and said:
"To the extent involved in the particular facts it involves,
we subscribe to the proposition that a party is entitled to intervene when he would necessarily gain or lose by the direct legal
effect of the judgment therein if he became a party to the action,
and to this extent only, and do not restrict the right to intervention to cases in which the intervener would gain or lose by
204. Wohlwend v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 42 'Minn. 500, 44

N. W. 517 (1890).

205. 7 Bench and Bar of Minnesota, Sept. 1950. p. 19.
206. 110 Minn. 311, 125 N. W. 676 (1910).
207. Id. at 314, 125 N. W. at 677.
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' 20
the direct effect of the judgment if he were not made a party. s

This is a correct statement of the holding of the case, and it has
been so understood by a leading commentator 20 9 and by the Advisory Committee itself.2 10 Patently it is desirable that such an
important liberalization in interpretation of the statutory language
should be codified in a rule which borrows that same language.
Thus if the Committee had achieved its desirable goal of expressing the Faricygloss in Rule 24.01, we would know that all continues
as it has been, and that it is enough that the intervenor will gain
or lose if he is allowed in. I suggest, however, that the language
chosen for this purpose, far from codifying the Faricy gloss, has
the opposite and entirely unexpected effect of codifying the restrictive reading which the court rejected in the Faricy case. Consider
again the language used: the intervenor may come in when he has
such an interest that he will gain or lose by the judgment "whether
or not he were a party to the action." My understanding of the
phrase "whether or not" is that it means "even if he is not," just
as in the small boys' game of "Hide and Seek" the familiar cry,
"ready or not, here I come," means "even if you are not ready, I
am coming." If this understanding is correct, and I can think of no
contrary usage of the phrase, what the rule says in effect is that
intervention will be allowed where the third party would gain or
lose by the judgment "even if he were not a party to the action."
The good work which the Supreme Court did in the Faricy case is
thus undone by this slip which the Court made in promulgating
the rules.
My comments in this regard are more in the nature of a plea
to the Court and its Advisory Committee to amend the rule than
advice to members of the bar or district judges. If I were a lawyer
and had a case like Faricy I wouldn't hesitate about moving to
intervene, and if I were a judge I would be just as quick to allow
the intervention. After all, even if the case no longer comes within
the literal language of the intervention-as-of-right rule, it can surely
be brought in under Rule 24.02, allowing permissive intervention
at the discretion of the court. And I should think that this sort of
slip in draftsmanship is just the sort of situation in which the trial
judge would unquestionably exercise his discretion favorably to the
intervenor.
Clauses 2 and 3 of Rule 24.01 also allow intervention as of
208. Id. at 319, 125 N. V. at 679-680.
209. 2 Pirsig's Dunnell §1922.
210. Advisory Comm. Note 4 to Rule 24.01.
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right where the representation of the applicant's interest by the
existing parties may be inadequate, and where the applicant may
be adversely affected by the distribution of property in custody of
the court. We can forget about these clauses, for in every situation which they cover the intervention would also be proper under
clause 1, the "gain or lose by the effect of the judgment" clause.
What has happened here is that clauses 2 and 3 are taken directly
from the equivalent Federal rule; they are necessary there, because
in the Federal system clause 1 is quite different and much narrower than is its counterpart in our rule.
Permissive intervention may be allowed "when an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common," 211 and in exercising its discretion the court is
told to consider whether the intervention will delay or prejudice
the original parties. The United States Supreme Court has told us
that the identical language of the Federal rule "plainly dispenses
with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the litigation." 212 Indeed the intervenor-by-permission does not even have to be a person who would have been a proper party at the beginning of the
suit.213 What this means is that of the two requirements for permissive joinder of parties, a common question of law or fact, and
some right to relief arising from the same transaction, only the
first test need be met for intervention.
Permissive intervention may be allowed where the intervenor
has an economic interest in the outcome of the suit, although not a
direct or a legal interest. 214 It is on this basis that the neighbors
are allowed to come into an action to set aside a zoning order, 21 6 and
that in an action in which the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers sought a declaratory judgment that their agreement with the
railroad allowed them to work more miles and days than they were
working, the firemen's union, arguing that the more days engineers work the fewer days firemen work, was allowed to intervene. 216 Indeed intervention may be allowed when the intervenor
211. Minn. R. C. P. 24.02. See Comm., Nature of Permissive Interven-

tion Under Rule 24b, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 704 (1940), and the discussion at
4 Moore's Federal Practice §24.10 (2d ed. 1950).
212. Securities and Exchange Comm. v. United States Realty and Im-

provement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 459 (1940).

213. Comm., 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 704, 707 (1940).
214. Champ v. Atkins, 128 F. 2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
215. Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F. 2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1944).

216. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, M., St. P. &

P. R. Co., 34 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Wis. 1940).
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has little more interest than the avoiding of a precedent which may
someday come back to haunt him.217 In an old Minnesota case it
had been held that a railroad could not intervene in an action to
reduce the rates of a competitor, even though, as a practical matter,
it would have to lower its rates to meet the competition.2 1 8 I should
expect a different result if the action were decided under the new
rules.
The procedure for intervention presents no particular problems: in every case the third party serves a motion to intervene,
accompanied by his proposed pleading, on all the parties who will
be affected.2 19 If the intervention is of right, the court will automatically grant the motion, while it will exercise its discretion if
the intervention is permissive. Despite some confusion in the
cases220 it is clear on principle that an intervenor has all the rights
of an original party, including the right to counterclaim. 221 The old
rule that the intervention had to be in "subordination" to the main
action, and that the intervenor could not introduce new and foreign
issues to the action 22 2 is gone.2 23 Of course where the intervention
is permissive the trial judge will have the intervenor's proposed
pleading in front of him when he decides whether to allow the intervention, and the fact that a proposed counterclaim would introduce
new issues and delay the main action could properly be given weight
in the judge's exercise of his discretion. I would suppose that in
any case the original parties have the right to counterclaim against
217. Cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. United
States ex rel Deavers, 183 F. 2d 65 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275 (1946), decided over Justice
Black's dissenting observation that "this case illustrates the wisdom of the
practice which permits parties to settle their own lawsuits without intervention by others interested only in precedents." Id. at 292. But cf. Jewell
Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, U. M. W., 3 F. R. D. 251 (W.D. Va.
1943), where the court decided intervention to make a precedent was improper, but allowed the applicant to participate in the trial, present argument, and file briefs as an amicus curiae.
218. Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 60 Minn. 461, 62 N. W.
826 (1895).
219. Minn. R. C. P. 24.03. Note, The Requirement of Timeliness Under
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,37 Va. L. Rev. 263 (1951).
220. Compare Otis Elevator Co. v. Standard Construction Co., 10
F. R. D. 404 (D. Minn. 1950) (allowing counterclaim), with Lempco Products, Inc. v. Simmons, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 13.12, case 1 (N.D. Ohio 1941)
(not allowing counterclaim).
221. Otis Elevator Co. v. Standard Construction Co., note 220 supra;
4 Moore's Federal Practice §24.17 (2d ed. 1950) ; Comm., Counterclaim By
Intcrz'ening Defendant, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 685 (1940).
222. Twin Cities Milk Producers Ass'n v. Oase, 199 Minn. 124, 271
N. W. 253 (1937).
223. Clark on Code Pleading 424-425 (2d ed. 1947) ; Park & Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F. 2d 984, 989 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1947).
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the intervenor if he is allowed in, and further, that the compulsory
2 4
counterclaim rule1
would apply to claims between the intervenor
and the original parties.
Col'CLUSION

At this law school's short course on the new rules last December, Dean Maynard E. Pirsig introduced me by saying that the
topic I was to cover-the same topic I have discussed in this paper
-was "important and difficult." I began my remarks by noting
that in my view joinder is neither important nor difficult, and I
concluded by telling my audience I hoped I had demonstrated that
my view was correct and the Dean's not. The same conclusion is
appropriate at this point. Of course joinder is important in the
sense that it will be immensely helpful in the cases in which it is
appropriate, but there are not really a great number of such cases.2-^5
As to the more pressing matter, is it difficult, I hope that the foregoing discussion has made it clear that it is not. Indeed I could
almost have stopped my discussion thirty pages earlier, at the
conclusion of my presentation of the philosophy of the joinder
,rules, were it not for the need to demonstrate by chapter and verse
that the old restrictions, and the worries and concerns which students and judges have built up around them, are now one with
Nineveh and Tyre. I think my final advice to the bar can be put
very simply: if there is any reason why bringing in another party
or another claim might get matters settled faster, or cheaper, or
more justly, then join them. Somewhere in the rules there is surely
authority for the joinder.
224. Minn. R. C. P. 13.01, discussed pp. 587-592 above.
225. Clark, Cases on Modem Pleading 669-670 (1952).

